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Abstract
This paper presents a history of the federal role in regulating the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of alcoholic beverages in the United States from the opening of the First Congress of 1789 to the
enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1918. Beginning with the passage of the nation’s ﬁrst
tariﬀ, imposing duties on imported beer, wine, and spirits, and ending with the onset of national
Prohibition and the complete ban on the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages, the story of
the federal regulation of alcohol from 1789 to 1918 encompasses a wide variety of political, economic,
sociological, and constitutional issues and features a series of epic debates and even violent struggles
involving all three branches of government.
On April 8, 1789, Representative James Madison of Virginia rose in the House of Representatives to propose
the ﬁrst substantive resolution ever considered by that newborn body, the levying of an import duty on
alcoholic beverages and a number of other commodities commonly used by the citizens of the young nation.1
Informing his colleagues that the subject was “of the greatest magnitude; requir[ing] our ﬁrst attention, and
our united exertions,” Madison called for the creation of a tariﬀ on rum and “all other distilled spirits,”
on Madeira wine and “all other wines,” and on the molasses that would be made into rum once it reached
American shores.2 From the moment Madison proposed his duty on intoxicating beverages, the role of the
federal government in regulating the manufacture, sale, and distribution of alcohol has been a ﬂashpoint
11 Annals of Cong. 106-07 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789). Although the House was scheduled to meet on March 4, it was not
until the ﬁrst day of April that a quorum was obtained. Representatives spent the ﬁrst week of April adopting organizational
rules, and it was not until the 8th that the oath of oﬃce was administered to the assembled members and substantive debate
began with Madison’s proposal. William E. Johnson, The Federal Government and the Liquor Traffic 54 (1917).
21 Annals of Cong. 107 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789).
1of controversy. From Madison’s proposal in 1789 to the ratiﬁcation of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1918,
that role varied widely, ranging from an almost complete abdication of responsibility over alcohol policy to
an unprecedented constitutional ban on the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating beverages.
This paper aims to present an overview of the history of the federal role in regulating the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of alcoholic beverages from the days of the ﬁrst Congress to the onset of Prohibition in
1918, focusing on the major themes and currents of opinion that have shaped that role.3
I. The Tariff Act of 1789
Madison’s rush to propose a uniform national duty on intoxicating beverages and other commodities stemmed
from the same circumstances that had led to the drafting and ratiﬁcation of the Constitution in which he
played so great a role. The Articles of Confederation, which required unanimity among the states for
the national government to take action, had proven woefully inadequate to address either the political
instability or the precipitous ﬁnancial situation of the vast, troubled nation that emerged from the struggles
of the Revolutionary War. Madison’s Constitution was designed to empower a national government with
the ability to take action for the good of the nation as a whole- and one that had the authority to raise the
funds that would allow it to do so. By taking advantage of the enhanced powers of Congress under the new
Constitution, Madison aimed to stabilize the dire ﬁnancial situation of the federal government as rapidly as
3Throughout this piece, the terms “alcohol,” “alcoholic beverages,” and “intoxicating beverages” will be used interchangeably
to describe the ﬁeld as a whole. The terms “ardent spirits,” “distilled spirits,” “liquors,” “spirits,” and “spirituous liquors”
will be used to describe such high-proof beverages as whisky, rum, and gin, while “beer,” “ale,” and “porter” identify subsets
of the general category of “malt beverages.” “Wine,” at least, can stand alone without a separate deﬁnition, although most
of the wines consumed by Americans in the nineteenth and early twentieth century bear little resemblance to those we enjoy
today. See infra, notes 134-136, 304 and accompanying text. Many of the legislators and justices cited in this piece casually
use the term “liquor” when referring to the general ﬁeld of intoxicating beverages or subsets thereof (e.g., “malt liquors”); any
instances in which that usage might cause confusion will be so noted in the text or footnotes.
2possible.4 As he explained to the House the morning he introduced his tariﬀ resolution, he hoped to use
the “establishment of a more eﬀective government...recovered from the state of imbecility that heretofore
prevented a performance of [the union’s] duty” to remedy the “notorious” deﬁciency of the Treasury.5
Along with the ﬁscal and protectionist questions standard to any debate over tariﬀ policy,6 the congressional
debate on Madison’s proposed import duties involved the question of temperance as well. Temperance, in
the early days of the republic, referred not as it would a century later to the abolition of all alcohol from
the national diet, but instead to the substitution of fermented and brewed beverages, such as wine and beer,
for distilled spirits like rum and whisky.7 Americans of the post-Revolutionary era took their liquor hard,
and they took it on a regular basis- rum, whisky, gin, and brandy were staples at every meal, at every
social event, and, not uncommonly, throughout the working day.8 While potable water was in short supply,
milk was diﬃcult to transport and carried the risk of disease, and tea and coﬀee were expensive, ‘ardent
spirits’ were cheap, plentiful, and relatively safe to drink.9 In his work The Alcoholic Republic, historian
W.J. Rorabaugh explains that from 1790-1830, “America may not have been [as one clergyman suggested]
‘a nation of drunkards,’ but Americans were certainly enjoying a spectacular binge.”10
Many prominent Americans of the time noted their fellow citizens’ drinking habits with dismay and sought
a substitute for the hardy ninety-proof beverages that served as a staple of the common American’s daily
diet. George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jeﬀerson each voiced their apprehension over the sheer
volume of hard liquor consumed by their countrymen,11 while Philadelphia physician Benjamin Rush, a signer
4See generally 1 Annals of Cong. 106-08 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789); Johnson, supra note 1, at 54.
51 Annals of Cong. 107 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789).
6For a good summary of the debate over the tariﬀ outside the context of temperance issues see generally August Thomann,
Liquor Laws of the United States; Their Spirit and Effect 9-24 (1893). August Thomann was hardly a disinterested
historian- he served as the director of the United States Brewers’ Association’s publications program and his book was published
by that organization. Nevertheless, Liquor Laws of the United States; Their Spirit and Eﬀect is as much a work of history as it
is of advocacy, and it serves as a valuable resource on a subject largely ignored by scholars. Every eﬀort has been made during
the writing of this piece to take account of Thomann’s bias.
7Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment 20 (1995).
8Id. See generally W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic 5-21 (1979).
9Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 95-96.
10Id. at 21.
11Id. at 5-6. Rorabaugh notes, however, that Washington owned and operated a whisky still, Adams began each day with a
3of the Declaration of Independence, led the nation’s ﬁrst organized campaign against distilled spirits.12
Unlike later temperance activists, however, the physicians, clergymen, and legislators of the late eighteenth
century who campaigned against hard liquor neither attempted to banish alcohol from the American diet
altogether nor saw any reason to do so. Their enemy was not drink, but drunkenness- speciﬁcally, the
drunkenness that resulted from the constant consumption of high-proof liquors. While Dr. Rush, for
example, marshaled the most vehement of arguments against hard liquor, he was known to praise the
German immigrants of his home state for eschewing spirits in favor of “beer, wine and cider”13 and to
advocate the drinking of wine made from native fruits.14 In a nation in which distilled spirits were the
drink of choice, temperance advocates of the late eighteenth century encouraged the use of such lower-proof
beverages as wine, beer and other malt beverages.15
The congressional debate over Madison’s proposed tariﬀ on intoxicating beverages therefore featured an
undercurrent of near unanimity on the wisdom, ceteris paribus, of encouraging a lowered consumption of
hard liquor in favor of a corresponding increase in the use of less powerful beverages to quench the thirst of
Americans so far as climate, custom, and availability would allow.16 Representative Thomas Fitzsimmons
of Pennsylvania, noting that ardent spirits were “a luxury of the most pernicious kind,” argued, “It will be
readily granted me, that there is no object from which we can collect revenue, more proper to be subjected to
a higher duty, than ardent spirits of every kind; if we could lay the duty so high as to lessen the consumption
in any great degree, the better.”17 He later elaborated, “If the morals of the people are to be improved by
tankard of hard cider, and Jeﬀerson was the “inventor of the presidential cocktail party.” Id.
12See id. at 39-46.
13Thomann, supra note 6, at 28.
14Andrew Barr, Drink: A Social History of America 37 (1999).
15See, e.g., Thomann, supra note 6, at 26 (“A rational temperance movement aiming, not at the destruction of the distilleries
and the total abandonment of spirituous liquors, but at a reﬁnement of drinking habits, was inaugurated long before the
assembling of the ﬁrst Congress.”). See generally Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 30-32, 36-46. For many years, although
temperance advocates touted both malt beverages and wine as replacements for ‘ardent spirits,’ it was far easier for them to
promote use of the former intoxicant than the latter. In the aftermath of the Revolution, wine was viewed as a drink of the rich
and frowned upon by most citizens as a product that had to be imported and was thus less patriotic than American-produced
spirits and beer. See Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 104.
16See Thomann, supra note 6, at 26-27.
171 Annals of Cong. 131 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789).
4what enters into their diet, it would be prudent of the national Legislature to encourage the manufacture of
malt liquors.”18 Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, who opposed a high import tax on rum due to the deleterious
eﬀect it would have on the New England shipping industry, nonetheless stated that so long as it did not
result in “violence” against other industries:
I would concur in any measure calculated to exterminate the poison covered under the form
of ardent spirits.... I approve as much as any gentleman the introduction of malt liquors, believing
them not so pernicious as the one in common use; but before we restrain ourselves to the use of them,
we ought to be certain that we have malt and hops, as well as brew-houses for the manufacture.19
Elbridge Gerry, also from Massachusetts, opposed a duty on molasses, fearing that it would doom his
state’s distilling industry while encouraging the importation of ﬁnished rum from the West Indies. He made
clear, however, his basic opposition to rum itself no matter from where it came, exclaiming, “It has been
frequently observed, that rum is injurious to the morals of the people; if I could have my wish, it would not
be to diminish, but to annihilate the use of it, both foreign and domestic, within the United States.”20
After extensive debate, the tariﬀ legislation passed both houses of Congress and was signed by President
George Washington on July 4, 1789, making it the second act passed under the new Constitution.21 The
Tariﬀ Act of 178922 imposed import duties on ale, porter, and beer; “Jamaica rum” and all other spirits:
wines, both Madeira and other varieties; molasses; and malt.23 The federal government’s regulation of
alcohol thus began with a tax designed to raise much-needed revenue for the young nation while protecting
its native brewing and distilling industries from foreign competition.
18Id at 150.
20Id. at 221.
21Johnson, supra note 1, at 57.
22Ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 (1789).
23Id. at 25.
5II. Hamilton’s Excise and the Whiskey Rebellion
It soon became clear, however, that the revenue provisions of Madison’s tariﬀ would not be suﬃcient to fund
the federal government. In addition to the $600,000 needed to ﬁnance the annual operation of government, an
estimated $2,239,000 per year was necessary to pay oﬀ the national debt compiled during the Revolution.24
The tariﬀ, however, would yield only an estimated $1,467,000 a year.25 In addition, to the extent that
Congress had intended the duties on alcohol to decrease consumption of hard liquor, it was clear that they
had not succeeded. Writing a century after the passage of the Tariﬀ Act, author August Thomann explained
the self-defeating nature of the tariﬀ:
Speciﬁc duties upon spirituous liquors were adopted ﬁrst, because their general consumption
oﬀered a strong guarantee for their becoming a lucrative source of revenue; and secondly, because,
for moral reasons, popular sentiment seemed to exact them. But the force of either of these reasons,
logically considered, must more or less attenuate the other, because they are based on opposite
assumptions. The eﬃcacy of the duties in the one case, must necessarily be proportionate to their
insuﬃciency in the other.... [U]nder the system adopted, it might occur- and did- that neither the
ﬁscal nor the moral objectives would be attained. Comparatively high duties might operate as a
check on the importation of liquors, and that would be a loss to the treasury; yet morality need
not necessarily gain anything by it, since the check on the importation must unavoidably act as a
correspondingly eﬀective impetus to domestic manufacture.26
Into this ﬁnancial crisis stepped Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, a ﬁscal conser-
vative willing to consider extending the tax on alcohol to internal production as well as imports.
Years before, in his contributions to what would come to be known as The Federalist Papers,
Hamilton, writing with Madison and John Jay under the pseudonym of ‘Publius,’ had advanced the pos-
sibility of a federal internal excise tax on spirits, arguing from ﬁnancial, pragmatic, and moral grounds.
24Tun Yuan Hu, The Liquor Tax in the United States 1791-1947 12 (1950).
25Id.
6In Federalist No. 12, ﬁrst published November 2, 1787, Hamilton ﬁrst endorsed an import tax on spirits,
writing:
The single article of ardent spirits under federal regulation might be made to furnish a
considerable revenue....That article would well bear [the] duty; and if it should tend to diminish
the consumption of it, such an eﬀect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy,
to the morals and to the health of the society. There is perhaps nothing so much a subject of national
extravagance as this very article.27
More provocatively, Hamilton continued by emphasizing, “A nation cannot long exist without revenue....Revenue,
therefore, must be had at all extents,” even if that meant “taxes on consumption.”28 During the campaign
to ratify the Constitution, Hamilton’s Federalist allies actively used this argument to marshal support for
the document from citizens who agreed with Hamilton’s assertion that the collapse of the public revenue
would lead to “private distress” among the citizenry.29
Nevertheless, as Washington’s Treasury Security, Hamilton initially refrained from advocating an internal tax
of any kind, well aware that Americans had inherited the English legacy of utter antipathy to internal taxes
of any sort.30 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone had written, “[T]he
rigor and arbitrary proceedings of excise-laws seem hardly compatible with the temper of a free nation,”31
while Dr. Samuel Johnson, in his famous dictionary of 1755, colorfully deﬁned excise tax as “a hateful tax
levied upon commodities, and adjudged not by the common judges of property, but wretches hired by those
to whom the tax is paid.”32 As the colonists’ reaction to Parliament’s imposition of the Stamp Act and the
tax on tea in the 1760s and 1770s had shown, Americans loathed such taxes even more vehemently than did
28Id. at 96.
29Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 50. See Federalist No. 12 at 96.
30Hu, supra note 24, at 11.
311 William Blackstone, Commentaries *318.
32Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language 170 (E.L. McAdam, Jr. & George Milne eds., 1963).
7their English counterparts.33
It therefore took a certain degree of courage for Hamilton to suggest, in a report to the House dated
January 14, 1790, that Congress not only increase import duties on spirits, but introduce the nation’s ﬁrst
system of internal revenue in order to tax them domestically as well.34 Hamilton followed this message
with an additional plea on March 6 of that year.35 In advancing the cause of an excise tax, Hamilton
took great pains to craft and present a system of collection that did not include those elements that had
so incensed generations of English subjects and their American descendants. There would be, for example,
no summary judgment allowed on the part of collections oﬃcers and no searches without warrants except
in areas speciﬁcally designated for storage by retailers and manufacturers.36 Cognizant of the fact that
Americans would object to an internal tax of any sort, no matter how many safeguards he introduced to
ensure its fairness, Hamilton coupled his promise of a fairly administered and courteously collected tax with
a strong moral plea:
That the articles which have been enumerated, will, better than most others, bear high du-
ties, can hardly be a question....[T]here is, perhaps, none of them, which is not consumed in so great
an abundance, as may justly denominate it a source of national extravagance and impoverishment.
The consumption of ardent spirits, particularly, no doubt very much on account of their cheapness,
is carried to an extreme which is truly to be regretted, as well in regard to the health and morals, as
to the economy of the community. Should the increase of duties tend to a decrease of consumption
of these articles, the eﬀect would be, in every way, desirable. The saving which it would occasion,
would leave individuals more at their ease, and promote a favorable balance of trade. As far as this
decrease might be applicable to distilled spirits, it would encourage the consumption of cider and
malt liquors, beneﬁt agriculture, and open a new and productive source of revenue.37
On April 27, 1790, acting on Hamilton’s impetus, the House passed a resolution to consider an internal tax
on distilled spirits.38 A bill was subsequently reported for a vote but went down to a resounding defeat in
33Johnson, supra note 1, at 69-70.
34Report of Alexander Hamilton to the House of Representatives, January 14, 1790, 1 American State Papers: Finance
15-25 (1832).
35Report of Alexander Hamilton to the House of Representatives, March 6, 1790, 1 American State Papers: Finance
151-58 (1832).
36Id. at 152-53.
381 Annals of Cong. 1599-1601 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
8June, a victim of the visceral opposition on the part of most Congressmen to an excise tax of any sort.39
Two additional events in 1790 increased the level of rancor surrounding Hamilton’s plans for an excise tax.
Over the course of the tumultuous second session of the First Congress, which lasted from January to August
of 1790, Hamilton and his allies in Congress secured the federal assumption of Revolution-related state debts
over the vehement opposition of Southern delegates by trading the establishment of the national capital on
the Potomac River, as desired by the south, for southern acquiescence in the debt assumption plan.40 This
compromise left many southern representatives bitter and determined to vote against any excise measure
that would tax their constituents to pay oﬀ the debt.41 These sectional divisions were inﬂamed when, in
late December, 1790, Senator Robert Morris and Representative George Clymer of Pennsylvania introduced
to their respective houses a resolution, submitted by Dr. Rush’s College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Philadelphia, requesting that Congress consider that “such heavy duties may be imposed upon all distilled
spirits, as shall be more eﬀectual to restrain their intemperate use.”42 Opposition was sudden and violent,
with Representative James Jackson of Georgia denouncing the members of the College, all northerners,
as “those gentlemen of the squirt [who] attempted to squirt morality into the minds of the members [of
Congress].”43
When Hamilton’s supporters in Congress reintroduced his legislation calling for even higher tariﬀ rates and
an internal tax on spirits in January of 1791, they therefore faced an uphill battle. Representative Jackson
39Id. at 1694-1700. See Hu, supra note 24, at 14.
40Thomann, supra note 6, at 39-40. As the session drew to a close, Congress passed a minor increase in tariﬀ rates on spirits,
wine, beer, molasses, and malt, but took no further action on internal taxes. Act of August 10, 1790, ch. 39, 1 Stat. 180 (1790).
41Thomann, supra note 6, at 40, 46.
421 Annals of Cong. 1886 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790), 2 Annals of Cong. 1783 (1790).
431 Annals of Cong. 1921 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
9began the new debate in the House by lecturing the House on the overwhelming consensus, dating back to
the time of Oliver Cromwell, that excises were an “odious tax,” citing Blackstone’s condemnation of the
measures as evidence.44 Josiah Parker of Virginia followed Jackson’s comments by exclaiming, “[The tax]
will convulse the government; it will let loose a swarm of harpies, who, under the denomination of revenue
oﬃcers will range through the country, prying into every man’s house and aﬀairs, and like a Macedonian
phalanx bear down on all of them.”45 Meanwhile, in the context of general southern anger over the fact that
Hamilton’s state debt assumption plan, which they had opposed from the start, had made acute the need for
additional federal revenue,46 southern representatives decried what they perceived to be an unfair burden
on their region. Jackson saw the tax as nothing less than a direct and outrageous attack on the south.
While residents of the eastern and middle states could fall back on their nascent cider and beer industries,
he heatedly explained to his colleagues, an excise tax on spirits would “deprive the mass of the people [in the
south] of almost the only luxury they enjoy, that of distilled spirits.”47 Representative John Steele of North
Carolina complained that the citizens of his state would, as a whole, pay ten times that of the residents of
Connecticut.48
Notwithstanding this opposition, the bill’s passage was secured by the eﬀorts of a coalition of pragmatists
and moralists. Madison, torn between his general opposition to excises and the desires of his Virginia
constituents on the one hand and his role as Hamilton’s ﬂoor leader in the House on the other, concluded
that an excise tax was the only way to save the federal ﬁsc and lent his inﬂuential support to the measure.49
Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire, leading the moralists, saw the measure as one that
was fair to all citizens and quipped that it would be agreeable to the citizens of the United States to support
44Id. at 1890-91.
45Id. at 1891-92.
46See Hu, supra note 24, at 14.
471 Annals of Cong. 1891 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
48Id. at 1896.
49Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 52-3; Hu, supra note 24, at 14-5.
10their nation by “drinking down the national debt.”50
The measure ultimately passed on extremely sectional lines and was signed into law on March 3, 1791.51 The
new law divided the country into fourteen districts, one for each of the then-existing states, but provided that
the president could alter boundaries for the purpose of easing the process of collection.52 It established the
nation’s ﬁrst revenue collection bureaucracy, with a supervisor of the revenue in each district in overseeing
a team of inspectors, each assigned to speciﬁc distilleries.53 Distillers were allowed a choice between paying
duties before the removal of spirits from a distillery or furnishing bond to secure payment following sale of
the spirits.54 To encourage the export of spirits, tax rebates were available to distillers for overseas sales.55
Owners of small stills could choose between paying a ﬁxed annual tax based on the capacity of their stills
or paying taxes on individual gallons as they were actually produced.56 Finally, the act stipulated that the
revenue collected under its authority could not be applied to the government’s current expenses, but instead
had to be used either to pay interest on the public debt or to pay down its principal.57
Despite the care taken to fashion as non-intrusive and ﬂexible a means of collection as possible, the tax on
distilled spirits engendered vehement and violent opposition among the citizenry from its inception. Even
before the measure had passed, in fact, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a resolution opposing any form of
501 Annals of Cong. 1896 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
51Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (1791). The vote in the House highlighted the sectional tension over the measure: representatives from
the New England states voted a unanimous seventeen to zero in favor of the bill, those from the middle states favored the bill
by a thirteen to eight margin, and the southern delegates opposed the bill ﬁve to thirteen. Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 53.
521 Stat. at 200.
53Id.
54Id. at 203.
55Id. at 210-11.
56Id. at 204.
57Id. at 213-14.
11an excise tax.58 A combination of hostility to the tax itself and to Hamilton’s ﬁnancial programs, especially
the assumption of state debts, led to the passage of anti-excise resolutions in Virginia, North Carolina, and
Maryland as well.59
It was in western Pennsylvania, however, that the opposition to the excise tax was strongest, ultimately
leading to the open revolt that came to be known as the “Whiskey Rebellion.” The source of the citizens’
outrage in that frontier region of the state stemmed from the very nature of their economy. Residents of
Pennsylvania’s western counties, situated beyond the Allegheny Mountains hundreds of miles from markets
for their rye and corn crops, saw distilling their excess grain and selling it in eastern markets as their only
opportunity to derive a livelihood.60 While the cost of transporting their grain to the east was prohibitive,
distilling allowed the frontier farmers a means of converting that grain into a valuable and transportable
product.61 As a result, nearly every farmer owned a still, and throughout the cash-poor region, whiskey was
so common a commodity that it was used as a medium of exchange.62 A tax on whisky therefore risked
depriving farmers of the market for the one proﬁtable product they had, eliminating the region’s single
source of revenue. Another problem posed by the tax stemmed from the overabundance of whisky in the
region. The ready availability of whisky lowered the price of the item far below that charged in the east, and
since the excise per gallon was set at a uniform national rate, this meant that the tax in the west comprised
a much higher percentage of the total cost of the product there than elsewhere.63 Finally, any citizen of
western Pennsylvania who was charged with a violation of the excise law was required to travel to the federal
court in Philadelphia, a distance of up to three hundred miles. The expense of that travel, along with the
costs of the trial itself and any ﬁnes imposed, threatened to ruin any individual who ran afoul of the revenue
58Thomann, supra note 6, at 56 (citing resolution of January 22, 1791).
59Id. at 60; Hu, supra note 24, at 17.
60Hu, supra note 24, at 19.
61Id.
62Id.
63Id. at 20.
12collectors.64
From the very beginning of the excise tax’s operation, therefore, the citizens of western Pennsylvania engaged
in both organized and unorganized resistance. On September 6, 1791, federal revenue collector Robert
Johnson was seized by a mob, which took his horse, cut oﬀ his hair, and tarred and feathered him.65 This
began a series of attacks on revenue oﬃcials, dutifully recounted by Hamilton in an August 4, 1794 report
to Congress detailing the opposition to the law.66 On August 21, 1792, representatives from the state’s four
westernmost counties gathered in Pittsburgh to draft a series of resolutions condemning the excise on spirits
and to pledge their refusal to deal with any individual assigned to collect the required duties.67
As noncompliance with the law remained the norm, violence against revenue oﬃcers continued, and collecting
the tax from Pennsylvanians became increasingly diﬃcult,68 Congress and the administration took steps to
assuage the discontent of the frontier citizenry in the hopes of quelling their revolt. In an act signed on
May 8, 1792, Congress, on Hamilton’s suggestion, reduced the internal duties across the board.69 On
September 15, Washington issued a proclamation “admonishing and exhorting” opponents of the excise tax
from obstructing operation of the law.70 In 1793, Hamilton’s Treasury Department implemented his plan
to encourage obedience of the law by purchasing whisky, for use by the army, from Pennsylvania distillers
who had complied with the law.71 On June 5, 1794, the president signed into law an act granting state
courts concurrent jurisdiction on excise tax violations, thus addressing one of the chief objections of western
64Id.
656 Annals of Cong 2852 (1794) (report of Alexander Hamilton).
66Id. at 2850-68. Hamilton’s report on “[t]he disagreeable crisis at which matters have lately arrived in some of the western
counties of Pennsylvania” is an expertly written summary of the actions the Washington administration took to address of one
of the most important tests faced by the new national government.
67Id. at 2856.
68See generally id. at 2850-57; Hu, supra note 24, at 24-26.
69Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 267 (1792); see Johnson, supra note 1, at 74.
701 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 124 (James D. Richardson ed., 1899).
71Thomann, supra note 6, at 88.
13residents by eliminating the need to travel to Philadelphia for trial in the federal courts.72
The result of the actions taken by the government to increase compliance resulted in a Pyrrhic victory, for
while the new measures succeeded in compelling the compliance of the large distillers and wealthier citi-
zens, in doing so, they removed the element of moderation and restraint that those parties had imposed on
other, less conservative, opponents of the tax. The remaining dissenters, with little to lose and few voices
of moderation among them, became more desperate and thus more violent.73 They turned on distillers who
complied with the law, shooting their stills through with holes in a processes dubbed, with no small irony,
“mending.” Those who “mended” stills were known as “tinkers,” and posters signed by a mysterious “Tom
the Tinker” were posted all over the region, containing threats to those who supported the tax as well as
instructions to the insurrectionists recommending further violence.74
The violence and mayhem grew until matters came to a head in July 1794. On the ﬁfteenth of that month,
a U.S. marshal, accompanied by the local revenue inspector, attempted to serve sixty writs on distillers who
had failed to register their stills as required under the excise tax. Over the following several days, the revenue
inspector was accosted twice by a mob, the second time so violently that he was forced to ﬂee in terror as
the mob burnt down his house. The marshal was taken prisoner and forced to promise never again to serve
a process in the western part of the state.75 On the twenty-sixth, insurrectionists intercepted the mail from
Pittsburgh, and, after reading through the captured letters, banished as traitors all citizens whose corre-
spondence had shown them to be sympathetic to the government.76 On August 1, seven thousand armed
men demonstrated throughout the western counties, marched through Pittsburgh, and began the process of
72Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 49, 1 Stat. 378, 381 (1794).
73Hu, supra note 24, at 24-25.
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14expelling all excise oﬃcers and exacting violent revenge on those they knew or suspected had obeyed the
hated excise law.77
On August 7, an alarmed Washington, acting on Hamilton’s recommendation, issued a strongly worded
proclamation to the insurrectionists ordering them “to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective
abodes” by September 1.78 A commission, authorized by Washington and sent by Governor Thomas Mif-
ﬂin of Pennsylvania, oﬀered full amnesty to the insurrectionists but was rebuﬀed by their leaders.79 On
September 15, Washington, having earlier acted pursuant to a 1792 law granting him the authority to call
forth the militia of one or more states “whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed...by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings,”80 ordered a total of ﬁfteen thousand troops gathered from Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Maryland, and Virginia to meet the rebels.81 Washington and Hamilton themselves joined the troops,
which were commanded by Governor Henry Lee of Virginia.82
By the time the federal forces reached the rebellious counties, however, the Whiskey Rebellion had collapsed,
its most fanatical supporters having decided to ﬂee the region rather than to stand their ground against Lee’s
troops.83 Not a shot was ﬁred, and while Lee left behind 2,500 troops to monitor the region,84 the matter
was ultimately ended by Washington’s July 10, 1795 proclamation granting a general amnesty to anyone
who had been involved in the rebellion.85
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781 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 158 (James D. Richardson ed., 1899).
79Thomann, supra note 6, at 100-03.
80Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792).
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15Throughout the 1790s, in addition to the speciﬁc steps they took to appease the rebels in Pennsylvania,
Congress and the Washington administration made a number of attempts to reform and reﬁne the system of
taxation and revenue collection. On June 5, 1794, hoping to raise funds without imposing a direct tax on the
people, Congress extended the excise tax to carriages, sugar, snuﬀ, auctions, bonds, and slave ownership.86
Another act passed that day imposed the nation’s ﬁrst federal license fee on retail sales of alcohol, requiring
retailers to pay ﬁve dollars a year for selling wines in quantities designed for retail consumption as well as
ﬁve dollars for selling imported spirits in that manner.87 On April 9, 1795, Washington, acting pursuant to
the authority granted to him by the 1791 excise legislation,88 drew up several new districts and appointed a
number of new oﬃcers, so that as of 1796, the revenue system employed sixteen supervisors (one for each state
and territory), twenty-two inspectors, two hundred thirty-six revenue collectors, and sixty-three auxiliary
oﬃcers, drawing a total compensation of $78,000.89 Over the course of the next three years, Congress passed
a series of acts granting relief to “country distillers,” that is, farmers who distilled their own whisky in small
quantities, thus mollifying to some degree the core constituency of the Whiskey Rebellion.90
None of these measures, however, could prevent the demise of the nation’s ﬁrst internal tax. Thomas
Jeﬀerson, in a letter to Madison dated December 28, 1794, had declared, “The excise tax is an infernal
one,”91 and when he became president seven years later, his ﬁrst message to Congress included a call for
the abolition of all internal taxes.92 As Jeﬀerson’s southern and western supporters, who now comprised
a majority of Congress, had opposed the excise all along, he had no trouble garnering support for the
measure,93 which he signed into law on April 6, 1802.94 On July 1, 1802, the law took eﬀect, and America’s
86Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51, 1 Stat. 384 (1794).
87Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 376 (1794).
88Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199, 200 (1791).
89Thomann, supra note 6, at 110.
90Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 159, 1 Stat. 492 (1796); Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 504 (1797); Act of January 29, 1798,
ch. 10, 1 Stat. 539 (1798).
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93See Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 55.
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16ﬁrst excise tax on alcohol, along with all other internal taxes, came to an end.95
In many ways, the tax on alcohol had been a failure. Evasion had been rampant, and the collection of
taxes from a reluctant and scattered citizenry had proven to be diﬃcult and hugely expensive. The total
amount collected from 1792 to 1801 was $3,675,818, a mere 5.1% of the total tax revenue (the majority of
which came from import duties).96 Not only were the costs of collection high, averaging twenty percent of
the amount collected every year,97 but the expedition to quell the Whisky Rebellion had cost a staggering
$1,223,251 to raise and supply- the equivalent of one-third of the total amount collected over the tax’s ten
years of operation.98
In addition, the eﬀect on consumption was negligible. While acknowledging that the failure of the tax had
much to do with “economic reality,” Rorabaugh argues that a deeper failing doomed the tax:
Americans in general hated the excise on domestic distilled spirits because it clashed with
post-Revolutionary principles....The majority of Americans resented a measure that appeared to
favor the rich who drank Madeira [wine] over the poor who drank whiskey. They condemned what
they considered to be both an infringement of their freedom to drink and an eﬀort on the part
of government to control their customs and habits. Furthermore, in the 1790s a ﬁerce republican
pride caused most Americans to resist any attempt by the wealthy and powerful to set standards of
morality and coerce the ordinary man to adopt them. The excise tax, aimed at curbing the use of
distilled spirits, was seen as just such an attempt. And so the measure failed. As for the antiliquor
reformers, they emerged from the wreckage of the whiskey tax controversy with neither a policy nor
a program. They watched with bewilderment and apprehension as the postwar tide of liquor rolled
onwards, engulﬁng America.99
Hamilton’s internal tax system, however, was an integral part of a remarkable decade-long economic achieve-
ment and an important precedent for the nascent federal government. By the time of Jeﬀerson’s ascension to
95Id. at 148.
96Hu, supra note 24, at 30.
97Jan-Willem Gerritsen, The Control of Fuddle and Flash 107 (2000).
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17the presidency, Hamilton’s system of taxation had succeeded so remarkably in stabilizing the once-precipitous
ﬁnances of the nation that it was no longer necessary.100 In addition, the Treasury Secretary had estab-
lished the authority of the federal government to impose an internal tax upon the citizens of the United
States. In a 1792 letter to Washington, Hamilton explained his fervent support for an excise tax, writing
that it was crucial “to lay hold of so valuable a resource of revenue before it was generally preoccupied by
the State governments...lest a total non-exercise of [federal authority] should beget an impression that it
was never to be exercised, and, next, that it ought not to be exercised.”101 By arranging the enactment
of an internal tax on spirits- and by defending the enforcement of that tax against open rebellion- Hamil-
ton established a crucial precedent.102 In short, Hamilton’s excise tax on spirits laid the groundwork for
all future federal taxes, not merely on alcohol, but on every imaginable commodity traded amongst the states.
III. The War of 1812 and the Second Excise
The ﬁscal policy that Jeﬀerson and his successor Madison sought to implement was always implicitly, and
sometimes explicitly, anti-Hamiltonian. Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury from 1801 to 1814 de-
scribed the reasoning behind that policy in his Annual Report for 1808:
The geographical situation of the United States, their history since the Revolution, and,
above all, present events, remove every apprehension of frequent wars. It may, therefore, be con-
ﬁdently expected that a revenue derived solely from duties on importations, though necessarily
impaired by war, will always be amply suﬃcient, during long intervals of peace, not only to defray
current expenses but also to reimburse the debt contracted during the few periods of war.103
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18When Madison took oﬃce the following year, he retained Gallatin in his Cabinet, signifying an intention to
continue the ﬁscal policies pursued over Jeﬀerson’s two terms, including the continued avoidance of internal
taxation on alcohol or any other commodity.
The onset of war with Britain a mere ten years after the abolition of the excise tax, however, forced Gallatin
to abandon his long-standing objection to internal taxation. Even before the war began, Gallatin had been
suﬃciently alarmed by the poor state of the federal Treasury to recommend to Congress that both direct
taxes and excise taxes would be needed to prepare for the hostilities that had seemed imminent to many
since the expiration of the Jay Treaty with England in 1807.104 On January 10, 1812, he sent a letter to
the House Ways and Means Committee informing its members, “There is not any more eligible object of
internal taxation than ardent spirits.”105 In light of Gallatin’s past, this was quite an ironic about-face: two
decades earlier, Gallatin had been a driving force behind western Pennsylvania’s opposition to Hamilton’s
tax on spirits and an active participant in the Whiskey Rebellion.106
Gallatin’s calls for an internal tax, however, went unheeded, and when war broke out on March 18, 1812,
Congress was forced to scramble for funds. An act doubling the import duties was passed on July 1 of that
year but did little to ease the ﬁnancial crisis caused by the onset of war.107 The enactment of a tax on spirits
was forestalled by an inconvenient political situation: the war was supported only by the southern states,
which were precisely where opposition to internal taxation ran deepest. The northeastern states opposed
taxation for a war they did not endorse; the southern states simply opposed internal taxation under any
104Hu, supra note 24, at 33.
105Letter from Albert Gallatin to Representative Ezekiel Bacon, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
January 10, 1812 (12th Cong., 1st Sess.), 2 American State Papers: Finance 525 (1832).
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19circumstances.108 Nevertheless, by the summer of 1813, the need for additional funds was so acute that
Gallatin was able to secure passage by the Republican Congress of a series of laws virtually reinstating in its
entirety the system of internal taxation on distilled spirits that it had cast aside eleven years earlier.109 A
July 22 act re-established, with minor modiﬁcations, Hamilton’s collection system;110 two days later Madison
signed into law a measure requiring distillers to pay a license fee.111 On August 2, Hamilton’s old license
fees were re-imposed on retailers of liquor and wine.112
Even these measures proved insuﬃcient to fund the war, and in September of 1814, Madison was forced to
call a special session of Congress to plead for more revenue.113 An act of December 21 of that year added
an excise duty on distilled spirits to the license fees for distillers already in place,114 while an act signed two
days later imposed an additional ﬁfty-cent charge for retail licensees.115 Both acts became eﬀective February
1, 1815- a mere sixteen days before the war came to an end.116
Whereas the debate over the ﬁrst excise tax on alcohol had featured an undercurrent of moral concern
and reformist enthusiasm for moderating the drinking habits of the population, the debates that led to the
taxes and duties imposed to fund the War of 1812 were couched exclusively in economic terms. In the
crisis situation created by the war, there was no talk of reducing consumption or improving the morals of
the nation. Furthermore, widespread and copious distilling had come to be taken for granted as a natural
byproduct of agriculture, and distilling was therefore targeted for taxation only out of a dire need for funds,
rather than as the result of a moral crusade to promote temperance.117 It was understood by both Congress
and the citizenry that the internal taxes on the manufacture and sale of alcohol were temporary responses
108Hu, supra note 24, at 33.
109See Thomann, supra note 6, at 135-37.
110Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 22 (1813).
111Act of July 24, 1813, ch. 25, 3 Stat. 42 (1813).
112Act of August 2, 1813, ch. 39, 3 Stat. 72 (1813).
113Hu, supra note 24, at 34.
114Act of December 21, 1814, ch. 15, 3 Stat.152 (1814).
115Act of December 23, 1814, ch. 16, 3 Stat.159 (1814).
116Hu, supra note 24, at 34.
117See Thomann, supra note 6, at 133-40.
20to the exigencies of war and that repeal would follow as soon as circumstances would allow.118
As such, following the conclusion of the war Congress took immediate steps to dismantle the system of internal
taxation.119 In his annual message to Congress for 1815, however, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Dallas
pleaded for the retention of the system of license fees for distillers and retailers of liquor.120 Remarkably,
this implicit but ﬁrm rejection of the Jeﬀersonian belief that import duties alone would be suﬃcient to fund
the federal government succeeded, at least temporarily, in staying Congress from eliminating the wartime
tax measures.121 In his ﬁrst message to Congress in December of 1817, however, President James Monroe
rejected the stance taken by Dallas, who was no longer serving as Treasury Secretary, and called upon
Congress to abolish all internal taxes. He stated:
It appearing that the revenue arising from the imposts and tonnage, and from the sale of
public lands, will be fully adequate to the support of the Civil Government, of [the army and navy],
to the payment of the interests on the public debt, and to the extinguishment of it at the times
authorized, without the aid of internal taxes, I consider my duty to recommend to Congress their
repeal.122
Congress obliged almost immediately, and three weeks later, on December 23, 1817, Monroe signed into law
an act abolishing all internal duties.123
IV. Congress Falls Silent, The Court Steps Forth
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21From December 31, 1817, the date on which the act of December 23rd took eﬀect,124 to August 1, 1862,
the manufacture and sale of alcohol within the borders of the United States was neither regulated nor taxed
in any manner by the federal government. Throughout that period Congress, following the policy set by
Monroe in his ﬁrst speech to Congress,125 maintained a series of tariﬀs on imported wine and spirits that,
while constantly varying in their particulars, consistently served to protect the domestic distilling industry
from foreign competition.126
Only twice over the course of these forty-ﬁve years of non-regulation did Congress consider the question
of alcohol outside the context of managing the tariﬀ rates. In 1826, the House considered a resolution to
simultaneously “increase the duty on all imported spirits, and to levy an excise on domestic liquors.” The
matter was referred to a select committee, which, after deliberating the matter, reported:
The committee...have no hesitation in expressing their opinion that no fairer subject of
taxation and revenue can be presented to the Government than ardent spirit, whether foreign or
domestic; and they would desire to see a larger portion of our revenues derived from this source....
Domestic liquors are made from various materials, and in every section of the country. They are used
by the citizens of the United States to an extent which many believe to be incompatible with the
public good, and perhaps the ratio is increasing beyond the ratio of population. The consequences
are deeply felt, and are greatly to be deplored by every friend of man. The question presented is not
whether, by sumptuary laws, we will prohibit intoxication; but whether intoxicating liquor is not a
fair and lawful subject of taxation, from which the Government may draw its revenues to pay the
public debt, to distribute widely the blessing of free schools, and improve the internal position of
our country? And if, by the imposition of such tax, the consumption of ardent spirits is diminished,
will not the public morals, the comfort and happiness of the community, the wealth and character
of the nation be advanced?127
This report,128 featuring arguments regarding temperance strikingly similar to those set forth by Hamilton
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22and his allies decades earlier,129 went nowhere, however, and Congress continued to rely exclusively on an
import duty on foreign spirits for revenue, thus allowing domestic spirits to be sold without any federal tax.
Such a system, of course, encouraged the consumption of domestic over foreign spirits but did nothing to
promote temperance.
Congress’s only other nod to temperance during this period was an 1832 act signiﬁcantly reducing tariﬀ
duties on all varieties of wine.130 Until 1819, when chemist William Brande published ﬁndings to the
contrary, most Americans had believed that wine contained no alcohol whatsoever.131 Even after Brande
dispelled this myth, many Americans, especially in the upper classes, believed that wine was far preferable
to spirits as a drink for the masses. Jeﬀerson himself had stated, “No nation is drunken, where wine is
cheap; and none sober, where the dearness of wine substitutes ardent spirits as the common beverage.”132
The lower tariﬀ resulted in a slight increase in consumption of wine among Americans, approximately three-
tenths of a gallon annually per person.133 It did not, however, result in a decrease in drunkenness. Once
the wine, which was mixed with alcohol by its European producers in order to preserve it during the trip
across the Atlantic, reached America, retailers increased their proﬁt margins by further adulterating it with
spirits and water.134 The resulting product consisted of twenty to thirty percent alcohol, which was far
greater than the natural alcohol content of the wine.135 This practice of “fortifying” the Madeira wine that
was imported from Europe was so common that it is estimated that the amount of adulterated Madeira
Americans consumed outnumbered the amount of pure Madeira imported by a ratio of ﬁve to one.136 As
a result, wine eventually fell out of favor with temperance activists both as a substitute for distilled spirits
129See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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131Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 101.
132Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to Monsieur de Neuville (December 13, 1818), in Jefferson and Wine, at 185 (R. de Treville
Lawrence ed., 1976)
133Rorabaugh, supra note 8, at 106.
134Id.
135Id.
136Id.
23among the working class and as the drink of choice among the generally upper-class activists themselves,
who increasingly concluded that it was hypocritical on their part to “deprive the laboring man of his drink”
while continuing to enjoy intoxicating beverages on their own.137 By the 1840s, the national consumption
of wine had fallen precipitously.138
Over the course of the long period of congressional near-silence on alcohol, an ever-growing grass-roots
temperance movement had resulted in a swell of prohibition laws in the states and a delicate constitutional
question that drew the Supreme Court into the controversial realm of alcohol regulation.139 The prelude for
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the constitutional implications of state prohibition laws was
the 1827 case of Brown v. State of Maryland,140 in which it ruled unconstitutional a Maryland law requiring
importers and wholesalers “of foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares, or merchandise, by bale
or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey and other distilled spirituous liquors” to purchase a license
from the state.141 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall held that Maryland’s act was
in direct conﬂict with both the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and that document’s dictate that “no
State shall lay and impost or duties on imports or exports,” and was thus invalid.142 Marshall additionally
found that the right to sell was “an inseparable incident” of the right to import,143 and that therefore so
long as a merchant had acquired from Congress the right to import an item, he had the right to sell that
item in its original packaging (that is, if he did not break up the imported item in such a way as to mix it
“with the general property of the State”) regardless of any state or local laws to the contrary.144
The Court’s ruling that state laws restricting foreign commerce were unconstitutional raised the question of
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24whether state laws restricting commerce between the states would meet the same fate. The Chief Justice
seemed to indicate that it would, noting, “It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down
in this case, to apply equally to importations from a sister State.”145 The passage, however, was clearly
dictum, and the question, for the time being, was left unanswered.
The question left open by Brown v. Maryland was ﬁnally answered in the negative twenty years later in a
trio of cases that came to be known collectively as The License Cases.146 In a single opinion addressing all
three cases, Chief Justice Roger Taney, while acknowledging that any act by Congress addressing the issue
would prevail over a state law to the contrary, held that in the absence of congressional action, the police
power of the states allowed them to regulate, and even prohibit, the importation of alcohol from sister states:
Although the gin sold was an import from another State, and Congress have clearly the
power to regulate such importations, under the grant of power to regulate commerce among the
several States, yet, as Congress has made no regulation on the subject, the traﬃc in the article may
be lawfully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory, and a tax imposed upon
it, or a license required, or the sale altogether prohibited, according to the policy which the State
may suppose to be its interest or duty to pursue.147
In a bewildering series of opinions (a total of nine, authored by six of the seven justices), the Court concurred
unanimously with Taney’s basic point. Justice Grier’s impassioned concurrence denied that the Commerce
Clause was relevant to the cases at all, arguing that the police power was suﬃcient to decide the matter in
an opinion that betrayed his sympathy for the cause of temperance:
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25[T]he true question presented by these cases, and one which I am not disposed to evade,
is, whether the States have a right to prohibit the sale and consumption of an article of commerce
which they believe to be pernicious in its eﬀects, and the cause of disease, pauperism, and crime. I
do not consider the question of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to regulate commerce as
necessarily connected with the decision of this point.... It is not necessary for the sake of justifying
the State legislation now under consideration to array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism,
and crime which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits. The police power, which is
exclusively in the States, is alone competent to the correction of these great evils, and all measures
of restraint or prohibition necessary to eﬀect the purpose are within the scope of that authority.
There is no conﬂict of power, or of legislation, as between the States and the United States; each is
acting within its sphere, and for the public good, and if a loss of revenue should accrue to the United
States from a diminished consumption of ardent spirits, she will be the gainer a thousandfold in the
health, wealth, and happiness of the people.148
The eﬀect of this ruling on a constitutional level was profound. The opinions in The License Cases negated
the Marshall Court’s previous attempts to clarify the eﬀect of the Commerce Clause on states’ abilities
to enact their own laws regulating interstate commerce.149 Under Marshall, the Court had taken the ﬁrst
steps towards establishing and interpreting what has since come to be known as the “dormant” Commerce
Clause. As it has subsequently developed, the dormant Commerce Clause has been used by the Supreme
Court to invalidate state legislation negatively aﬀecting interstate commerce in a given area even in the
absence of congressional action in that area, based on the assumption that the Constitution’s delegation to
Congress of the power to regulate commerce among the states implies a denial of power to the states to enact
legislation that has a protectionist or discriminatory eﬀect on interstate commerce.150 In their casebook on
constitutional law, Gerald Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan explain, “After Marshall’s death in 1835, the
Court, under [Taney], searched for formulations of the negative implications of the commerce clause with
little clarity or agreement.”151 The License Cases was an important development en route to the Taney
Court’s eventual agreement four years later on a single standard in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.152 In that
case, the Court held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution merely limited, rather than barred, state
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26regulation of foreign and interstate commerce. Justice Benjamin Curtis’s opinion in Cooley drew a distinction
based on the “subject” of the legislation involved, holding that some subjects were “national,” requiring a
“single uniform rule” set by Congress, and others “local,” not only allowing, but in fact “imperatively
demanding” that states be allowed to regulate the subject in order to “meet the local necessities.”153
The holding in The License Cases, as neatly conﬁrmed by Cooley’s national-local distinction,154 allowed
statewide prohibition laws to ﬂourish. Marshall’s dicta in Brown v. Maryland had raised the specter of such
laws being rendered unworkable and irrelevant. If, as Marshall had implied, the constitutional proscription on
state laws barring merchants from importing items from abroad and selling them in their original packaging
extended to laws relating to the importation of items from state to state, state prohibitory laws would
be weakened to the point of irrelevancy. As an example, if Massachusetts placed an absolute ban on the
manufacture or sale of alcohol within its borders but was constitutionally required to allow its merchants
to import and sell Connecticut spirits, the purpose of the prohibitory laws- temperance- would be utterly
thwarted. So long as some Massachusetts residents wished to enjoy intoxicating beverages,155 all that the
law would accomplish would be the enrichment of out-of-state distillers and retailers at the expense of
Massachusetts citizens. Although The License Cases would eventually be overruled,156 for the time being,
the door had been opened for eﬀective state prohibitory laws. The decision in that case ensured that ‘dry’
states would not be inundated by a steady supply of alcohol from outside their borders. By 1855, fourteen
states had passed laws restricting or prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages.157
153Id. at 319.
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27Notwithstanding the enactment of prohibitory laws in several states, however, a combination of years of
high tariﬀs and benign congressional inattention towards the domestic intoxicating beverages trade caused
the alcohol industry to ﬂourish. By the time Congress ﬁnally imposed a signiﬁcant reduction on tariﬀs
in 1857,158 the domestic alcoholic beverages industry had enjoyed decades of growth unimpeded by federal
taxation and decisively aided by an avowedly protectionist tariﬀ system, and had enjoyed tremendous growth
and proﬁtability throughout the non-prohibition states. The combination of a staggeringly high volume of
production and miniscule production costs created a situation in which distillers were able to maintain high
proﬁt margins while selling their products at aﬀordable, untaxed prices. As a result, according to David A.
Wells, who would later serve as the Chairman of a Special Commission on Internal Revenue appointed by
Congress in 1865,159 “In short, previous to 1860 a man could undoubtedly get drunk in the United States
with a less expenditure of money than in any part of the civilized world.”160
V. The Civil War
The onset of the Civil War led to a need for revenue such as the young nation had never experienced,
dramatically changing the federal government’s role in regulating the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
beverages. On July 4, 1861, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase reported to Congress that from
June 30, 1860 to June 30, 1861, the government had taken in a total of $86,972,893 (over half of which
came from Treasury Notes and loans rather than from revenue obtained through import duties) and had
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28spent $84,577,258. This left the Treasury with a grand total of $2,395,635 on hand to fund a government
that Chase estimated would need $318,519,581 for the next year alone.161 Congress, however, hesitated to
reinstate an excise tax on alcoholic beverages, instead raising the tariﬀ on wine, spirits, and other imports
and imposing a tax on land as well as the nation’s ﬁrst income tax.162 In December 1861 report, Chase
indicated that the estimated deﬁcit for the ﬁscal year would be $213,904,497. Believing, however, that “the
war may be brought to an auspicious termination before midsummer [1862],” he merely called for Congress
to obtain loans and increase the current tariﬀ and tax rates.163
The new year, however, brought not a speedy end to the war but instead an increasing realization that the
struggle to preserve the Union would be long, arduous, and expensive. In response, the House Committee on
Ways and Means conducted hearings in order to ascertain from the leaders of various industries what levels
of taxation they could bear,164 their objective being to tax as many items as possible at as high a rate as
possible in order to satisfy the nation’s desperate need for revenue.165 On March 12, 1862, upon introducing
to the House the bill that resulted from the Committee’s deliberations, Representative Anson P. Morrill of
Maine explained its proposed duties on alcohol in both pragmatic and moral terms:
The duties proposed by the present bill rest heavily on spirits and malt liquors- being about
one hundred per cent on raw whiskey, ﬁfty per cent on rum, and twenty-ﬁve per cent, on ale or
beer- but far below the point at which even some prominent distillers thought they might be safely
carried, and yet largely above the point indicated by those engaged in the business.... Much the
largest quantity of spirit produced in this country is from corn, and many persons apprehend, that
we shall cut them up by the roots with a duty so high as even ﬁfteen cents per gallon, and that
great injury will result to farming interests thereby. The committee were satisﬁed these fears are
not well founded. So long as consumption keeps equal pace with production- as in the case of
all manufactures- the consumer must pay the increased cost price. The consumption will not be
seriously checked; and, if it could be, such a result would bring us no national disgrace. Whiskey
and rum, with the duty added, will still leave it possible for any man or brute to get drunk in our
land on cheaper terms than in any other that I know of.166
161Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix 4 (1861).
162Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292 (1861).
163Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., Appendix 25 (1861).
164Thomann, supra note 6, at 200.
165Johnson, supra note 1, at 84.
29Nine days later, Morrill, who had left the Democratic Party in 1853 when it opposed prohibition in Maine,167
elaborated his moral stance, stating:
If you make this tax so high as to prohibit the traﬃc, which it does not propose to do, you
can do no more valuable service to your country. I would make the tax so high that no wholesaler or
retailer could be found in the land, if it were practicable. If you would do that, if you could entirely
stop the use of intoxicating drinks and the war rage on, your country would suﬀer less by the war
than it has and does from the use of intoxicating liquors.”168
Despite a general acceptance of the need to tax everything possible to fund the war, the proposed duties
on alcohol elicited objection from a surprising source- the prohibitionists. The existence of state prohibition
laws created an awkward dilemma for the representatives of prohibition states when Congress took up the
debate on Morrill’s revenue bill. By licensing the sale of alcohol, Congress could be seen to be endorsing it,
a thought that was utterly repugnant to a number of senators and representatives.169 Senator Henry Wilson
of Massachusetts, for example, moved to eliminate the entire section of the bill licensing liquor retailers,
explaining:
I do not think any man in this country should have a license from the Federal government
to sell intoxicating liquors. I look upon the liquor trade as grossly immoral, causing more evil than
anything else in this country, and I think the Federal government ought not to derive a revenue from
the retail of intoxicating drinks.... The man who has paid the Federal government twenty dollars
for a license to retail ardent spirits will feel that he is acting under the authority of the Federal
government, and that any regulations, state or municipal, interfering with him, are mere temporary
and local arrangements, that should yield to the authority of the Federal government. Sir, I hope
the Congress of the United States is not to put upon the statute book of this country a law by which
tens of thousands of persons in this country who are dealing out ardent spirits to the destruction
of the health and life of hundreds of thousands and the morals of the nation, are to be raised to a
respectable position by paying the Federal government twenty dollars for a license to do so.170
Senator Wilson and his allies were ﬁnally molliﬁed by assurances that the bill was merely a temporary
measure intended to address the exigencies of war and by the inclusion of a compromise passage in the ﬁnal
version of the bill. That passage read:
167Johnson, supra note 1, at 85.
169Johnson, supra note 1, at 85.
30That no license hereinbefore provided for, if granted, shall be construed to authorize the
commencement or continuation of any trade, business, occupation, or employment therein men-
tioned, within any state or territory in which it shall be specially prohibited by the laws thereof, or
in violation of the laws of any state.171
This was an odd compromise, especially in light of the fact that the previous two excises on spirits had
explicitly barred the granting of federal retail licenses in states where the sale of alcohol was illegal.172 The
1862 provision, which implied that the federal government could collect a license fee from enterprises that
were illegal under state law, is best understood in light of the change in circumstances since the enactment
of the prior two excises on alcohol. During the Civil War era, unlike in 1794 and 1813, the United States
had a number of states attempting- and failing- to enforce prohibition within their borders. As reluctantly
admitted by a number of representatives from prohibition states, despite state laws barring the retail sale
of alcohol, such sales took place on a regular basis.173 Not to charge a licensing fee to such retailers would
not only have deprived the revenue-starved government of a ready source of income but would have created
the anomalous situation of alcohol being tax-free, and thus less expensive, in prohibition states than in
non-prohibition states.174 Under the circumstances, federal taxation on illegal state alcohol sales may have
172The act of June 5, 1794 granted licenses “Provided always, That no license shall be granted to any person to sell wines or
foreign distilled spirituous liquors, who is prohibited to sell the same by the laws of any state,” Ch. 48, 1 Stat. 376, 378 (1794)
(emphasis in original), while the act of August 2, 1813 granted them “Provided always, That no license shall be granted to any
person to sell wines, distilled spirituous liquors, or merchandise, as aforesaid who is prohibited to sell the same by any state.”
Ch. 39, 3 Stat. 72, 73 (1813) (emphasis in original).
173See Thomann, supra note 6, at 207-10.
174In the years to come, the collection of federal license fees (later explicitly renamed taxes by Congress) would create conﬂict
with state laws. An 1872 federal law required revenue collectors to keep a list of those who paid the retail liquor tax in their
oﬃces, while a number of state laws provided that the payment of the tax was prima facie evidence that an individual was
selling spirits. This led to the regular subpoenaing of revenue collectors to testify against alleged liquor retailers in state courts.
This practice came to be so common that in 1896, in order to protect taxpayers’ privacy and to eliminate the extensive time
commitment required by state court appearances, the Secretary of the Treasury established a regulation barring tax collectors
from divulging private citizens’ tax information to the states. The ruling came to help distillers, as well as retailers, at the
expense of the states. Since the federal government only taxed spirits when they were withdrawn from bonded warehouses after
an aging period (see infra, notes 291-293 and accompanying text), the ruling barring federal revenue oﬃcials from divulging
tax information, including their information on what was inside the warehouses, meant that state governments would have to
accept the distillers’ word when valuing their warehouse stocks for tax purposes. Johnson, supra note 1, at 90-93. The ruling
was eventually challenged in federal courts and was upheld by the Supreme Court. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-70
(1900) (“In our opinion the Secretary [of the Treasury], under the regulations as to the custody, use and preservation of the
records, papers and property appertaining to the business of his Department, may take from a subordinate, such as a collector,
all discretion as to permitting the records in his custody to be used for any other purpose than the collection of the revenue,
and reserve for his own determination all matters of that character.”) The fact that the 1896 Treasury regulation barred only
the sharing of taxpayer information with states, not other federal agencies, led to an interesting set of interactions within the
executive branch. In 1895, Congress passed a law forbidding the sale of liquor in the Indian Territory that would ultimately
31appeared to be the lesser of two evils.
With this compromise in place, the bill was passed and signed into law on July 1, 1862.175 It imposed a tax
of twenty cents per proof gallon176 as well as license fees for distillers, brewers, wholesale dealers, and retail
dealers.177 As the war continued and the need for revenue became greater, the tax on spirits, which came
into eﬀect on August 1, 1862,178 was increased to sixty cents per gallon by an act of March 7, 1864.179 An
act of July 30, 1864180 imposed both an immediate increase to $1.50 and a subsequent raise, seven months
later, to $2 per gallon.181
VI. The Special Commission and the 1868 Reforms
As the war drew to a close, Congress appointed a Special Commission, chaired by respected scholar David
A. Wells,182 to examine the internal revenue measures that had been enacted over the course of the conﬂict
and to issue recommendations as to how to revise the system.183 The Commission’s report was delivered to
become the state of Oklahoma. The taxation of liquor retailers continued to take place within the Territory, however, leading
to a rather awkward situation in which the Treasury Department would tax individuals retailing in violation of federal law and
the Justice Department would obtain Treasury records to use as evidence of that taxation to convict the same individuals for
violating that law. Id. at 95-96.
175Ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
176Id. at 447. The tax was essentially based on a beverage’s alcohol content: a gallon of one hundred proof whisky equaled
a proof gallon and was taxed at twenty cents, whereas it would take ﬁve gallons of a twenty proof liquor to equal one proof
gallon. See Hu, supra note 24, at 37.
17712 Stat. at 446.
178Id. at 447.
179Ch. 20, 13 Stat. 14, 14 (1864).
180Ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223 (1864).
181Id. at 243. The increase to a $2 duty was originally scheduled for February 1, 1865; an act of December 22, 1864 struck
the word “February” from the relevant portions of the June 30 act and replaced it with a new eﬀective date of January 1, 1865.
Act of December 22, 1864, ch. 8, 13 Stat. 420 (1864).
182See infra, note 159 and accompanying text.
183Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 487 (1865).
32Congress on January 29, 1866,184 and along with Commissioner Wells’ subsequent writings on the subject,
form a comprehensive and invaluable set of resources to assess the state of federal regulation of alcoholic
beverages following the radical changes of the Civil War.
The Commission reported that despite the pronounced and rapid increases in the tax on spirits, consumption
apparently fell little. The poor had turned to “the cheapest and worst class of spirits,” that is, adulterated
spirits.185 The well-to-do, on the other hand, had displayed a remarkable willingness throughout the war
to buy the wine and spirits they desired. The Commission, noting the lack of evidence that consumption
by the wealthy decreased at all, wryly observed, “there are no people less inclined to regard expense in the
gratiﬁcation of their desires and appetites than the Americans.”186
The Commission therefore encouraged the continuance of a tax on spirits, invoking the combination of moral
and practical considerations that had marked discussion of the topic since Hamilton’s time:
That distilled spirits ought to contribute a very large proportion of the amount which the
necessities of the country require shall be annually raised by internal taxation is, we believe, the
almost unanimous sentiment of the whole country. It may, indeed, be considered as an axiom in
political economy, that there is no article which creates a fairer subject for excise, and none which
can be made to produce so much revenue with so little suﬀering to the taxpayer.... That distilled
spirits can, furthermore, without detriment to any business interests of the country, be made to
yield a revenue suﬃciently large to lighten the burden on almost every other branch of industry, is
an assertion that seems to scarcely need proof to substantiate.187
Despite the Commission’s conﬁdent assertion that taxes on spirits ought to and could be collected, it was
not as sanguine about the federal government’s performance in actually collecting those funds during the
Civil War. The Commission ﬁrst found fault with a major loophole in the revenue system that served to
184Reports of a Commission Appointed for a Revision of the Revenue System of the United States, 1865-66 (1866)
[hereinafter “Special Commission Report”].
185Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 179. See Hu, supra note 24, at 40.
186Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 179. The use of alcohol for non-beverage purposes (e.g., in industry and
in the manufacture of vinegar), however, fell precipitously. See generally id., 161-65; Hu, supra note 24, at 38-39.
33enrich distillers at the expense of the government. In early 1862, when the House Committee on Ways and
Means had interviewed industry representatives to ascertain proper tax levels,188 distillers, aware that in
the past intoxicating beverages had been Congress’s very ﬁrst target in times of ﬁscal crisis, enthusiastically
supported taxation in a seeming display of patriotism. In voicing their support, they merely requested that
any tax contemplated be laid on future production only, exempting existing stock from the tax. At the time,
Senator John Sherman of Ohio objected vehemently, stating:
It has been known ever since last July that a tax would be put on whisky, and all the
distillers of the country have been running to their extremist capacity, and today they are running
more than they have ever done before. Every old still in the country has been set at work, simply
because it was supposed that a tax would be put on whisky, and that the stock on hand would not
be taxed.189
Congress ignored Sherman’s warnings, thus presenting the distillers with a series of opportunities to make
spectacular proﬁts. Before the introduction of the tax and each of the tax increases, distillers would increase
production to the highest possible level, building up their stocks in anticipation. Once the tax or increase
was passed, they would sell their old stocks, taxed at the old level, at a price that reﬂected the level of
current taxation. This could result in quite a hefty proﬁt; for example, selling spirits on which they paid a
sixty cent tax at a price reﬂecting the rate of taxation of $1.50 for current production meant an extra ninety
cents per gallon in the pocket of the distiller.190 The Commission was harshly critical of this practice:
The immediate eﬀect of the enactment of the ﬁrst three and successive rates of duty was to
cause an almost entire suspension of the business of distilling which was resumed again with great
activity as soon as an advance in the rate of tax in each instance became probable. The stock of
whiskey and high-wines accumulated in the country was without precedent; and Congress, by its
refusal to make the advance in taxation, in any instance, retroactive, virtually legislated for the
beneﬁt of distillers and speculators rather than for the treasury and the government. The proﬁts
realized by the holders of stocks, thus made in anticipation of the advance in taxation, has probably
no parallel in the history of any similar speculation or commercial transactions in this county, and
cannot be estimated at less than ﬁfty millions of dollars.191
188See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
190Johnson, supra note 1, at 103.
34Writing twenty years later, Wells revised his appraisal upwards, estimating that between the institution of
the tax on July 1, 1862 and its increase to the rate to $2 a gallon on January 1, 1865, “distillers, dealers,
[and] speculators” made a proﬁt of approximately one million dollars simply from manipulating the system
of rate increases in their favor.192
Another source of criticism by the Commission was the ease and prevalence of fraud and tax evasion. For
the ﬁscal year of 1863, ending June 30, when the tax was twenty cents a gallon, the government collected
$3,229,991 from 16,149,953 tax-paid gallons. In ﬁscal 1864, during which the tax rose to sixty cents, it
collected $28,431,798 oﬀ of 85,295,392 gallons. In ﬁscal 1865, however, despite the jump to a $1.50 and
then $2 tax, the ﬁgures plummeted to $15,031,456 and 9,212,111 gallons.193 In light of the Commission’s
ﬁndings that consumption stayed steady throughout the war, the huge drop in reported production indicated
incredibly widespread fraud and evasion. As the Commission noted, with an average cost of production of
whisky at the time ranging from seventeen to twenty-four cents, and the tax initially set at twenty cents per
gallon, “the premium oﬀered for the evasion of the law is about one hundred percent.”194 When the tax rose
to $2, the evasion premium rose to a staggering range of eight hundred to twelve hundred percent.195 The
proﬁt margin for producers who sold their product at market prices reﬂecting the high taxes but then failed
to actually pay the tax was therefore tremendous. The result was a system that yielded, in the years 1866
and 1867, about ﬁfteen million reported gallons a year against an estimated annual production of forty-two
to forty-ﬁve million gallons.196
The Commission assailed Congress for its failure to address the fraud directly or to give the Secretary of
192Wells, supra note 160, at 198.
193Hu, supra note 24, at 40.
194Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 180.
195Hu, supra note 24, at 42.
196Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 172. See Hu, supra note 24, at 42.
35the Treasury or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the power to do so.197 Although Congress had
authorized the hiring of a trio of detectives in 1863 to investigate the collection of the spirits excise, little
progress was made.198 The Commission’s report to Congress contained a laundry list of failures in oversight:
inspections of proof made by taste, rather than by the use of instruments; barrels ‘inspected’ and branded
days before they were ﬁlled with the product that was supposed to be inspected; and “distillers or their
workmen...not unfrequently” serving as inspectors in their own distilleries.199 The Commission’s report
continued with damning excerpts from the testimony of four revenue agents, one of whom noted, “There
never has been any oﬃcer appointed under the revenue act, whose special duty it was to look after distillers.”
Rather, he explained, the system was comprised of independent inspectors collecting small fees for quick,
easy inspections:
In most cases all the inspectors ever thought of doing was, to go and inspect the liquors
when the distillers sent for them. Whatever barrels of liquor happened to be ready, they inspected
and then went away. I have heard of cases where barrels were inspected and marked in advance of
being ﬁlled.200
The Commission’s suggestions for change were based on a combination of pragmatism and their assessment
of both public opinion and the general mood among the members of Congress. In opening the section of its
report addressing the excise on alcohol, the Commission explained:
In respect to distilled spirits, the commission, taking as their guide the history of past
congressional legislation, and what seems to them to be the general public sentiment of the country,
assume in the outset that it is to be the future policy of the government to impose upon those
articles the maximum imposts which they can bear, without too largely encouraging attempts at
evasion of payment by the smuggler, the illicit distiller, and the retailer.201
197Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 174.
198Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 74, 12 Stat. 713, 727 (1863); see Moore, supra note 99, at 17.
199Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 174. The commissioners concluded the list in disgust with the statement
that “at least one case is known to the commission where the assessor, or inspecting oﬃcer, apparently did not possess suﬃcient
intelligence to understand and correctly use an hydrometer,” apparently a cardinal sin for a revenue oﬃcial of the time. Id.
36The Commission therefore recommended reducing the tax on proof gallons from $2 to $1 in order to encourage
compliance.202 It also impressed upon Congress the importance of establishing a system of revenue collection
that was both viable and well-staﬀed.203
In 1868, drawing upon the Special Commission’s report as well as on prior systems of excise taxes on
intoxicating beverages both in the United States and in European countries, the Fortieth Congress passed
a comprehensive measure revising the system of collecting revenue from the production and sale of alcohol
that would stand, with minor modiﬁcations, until Prohibition.204 Although following the Civil War Congress
had repealed most of the emergency revenue measures enacted over the course of the conﬂict, a consensus
prevailed that the indirect excise taxes on alcohol (as well as those on tobacco) should be retained to meet the
nation’s need for revenue beyond that which was provided by import taxes.205 The Commission’s ﬁndings
had made it clear that changes in the structure of those taxes would be required if they were to be retained as
a permanent revenue measure, and the 1868 legislation was Congress’ acknowledgment that after decades of
noninvolvement in the regulation of domestically produced intoxicating beverages and ﬁve years of a clumsy,
ineﬃcient tax, it had reached the same conclusion.
The new act lowered the tax on distilled spirits from $2 to ﬁfty cents per gallon206 and established a system
of adhesive stamps to indicate payment of the tax.207 Most importantly, Congress replaced the ad hoc
collection system of the past with a ﬁnely detailed program of strict regulations and thorough inspections to
be conducted by a team of revenue oﬃcers entrusted with an unprecedented amount of authority. The act,
for example, not only made it lawful “for any revenue oﬃcer, at all times, as well by night as by day, to enter
202Special Commission Report, supra note 184, at 180-81.
203Id. at 180, 193-94.
204Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125 (1868).
205Gerritsen, supra note 97, at 107.
20615 Stat. at 125.
207Id. at 134-38.
37into any distillery, or building, or place, used for the business of distilling, or in connection therewith”208
but also gave inspectors full authority “to break up the ground” at distilleries to search for contraband.209
VII. Corruption, Cooperation, and the Commerce Clause
The passage of the 1868 act was not an immediate panacea. Although the lowered duty encouraged compli-
ance by making illicit production worth neither the cost of evasion nor the risk of capture, nostalgia on the
part of the distillers for the incredible proﬁts they had made during the war led to agitation for a higher rate
of tax.210 In this campaign they were joined by unlikely allies from within the temperance movement who
believed that higher taxes on distilled spirits were the key to reducing consumption.211 On June 6, 1872,
the tax was raised to seventy cents per gallon,212 while on March 3, 1875, an additional jump was made to
ninety cents per gallon.213 On both occasions, stock on hand was exempted from the new rate, resulting
once again in huge proﬁts for the many distillers who had the prescience to hoard their stocks in anticipation
of the raise.214
The distillers, however, were not the only ones proﬁting from the windfall. In 1875, Secretary of the Treasury
Benjamin H. Bristow exposed a vast national scandal, encompassing distillers, revenue oﬃcials, and Repub-
lican politicians. The “Whiskey Ring,” as it came to be called, originated with the use of revenue oﬃcials
to raise money for campaign funds by accepting bribes from distillers in lieu of the taxes they had been sent
208Id. at 139.
209Id. at 140.
210Hu, supra note 24, at 45.
211Id.
212Act of June 6, 1872, ch. 315, 17 Stat. 230 (1872).
213Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 125, 18 Stat. 339 (1872).
214Hu, supra note 24, at 45.
38to collect. In theory, distillers paid less than the amount called for by the tax, revenue oﬃcials kept their
patronage jobs by passing the funds upwards, and their politically appointed superiors used the funds to en-
sure that the politicians who had appointed them stayed in oﬃce. In practice, however, the St. Louis-based
operation quickly became a nationwide racket, expanding to Milwaukee, Chicago, Peoria, Cincinnati, New
Orleans, and even Washington, D.C and serving as nothing more than an opportunity for graft on all levels
of government and the liquor industry. The corruption was as meticulous as it was widespread, with proceeds
shared according to a ﬁxed price list. By the time Bristow ﬁnished his investigation, 152 members of the
liquor industry and eighty-six government oﬃcials had been indicted, including the Treasury Department’s
supervisor of internal revenue for the St. Louis area, a former chief clerk of the Treasury Department, and
President Ulysses S. Grant’s personal secretary. It is estimated that in St. Louis alone, the government was
defrauded out of $1,200,000.215
The Whiskey Ring had been an overwhelming scandal for the federal government, but its dismantling pro-
vided a tremendous opportunity for reform. The exposure of such widespread corruption within the civil
service led to reforms that, in turn, resulted in an increased level of competence and professionalism among
the men collecting the tax on distilled spirits. In 1876, Grant appointed former Union general Green B.
Raum as the Commissioner of the Oﬃce of Internal Revenue.216 Raum proceeded to rebuild an organization
tainted by scandal by hiring a variety of individuals, from lawyers to shop clerks, who helped the revenue
service gain an unprecedented level of respect.217
More importantly, however, the collapse of the conspiracy created an urgent need on the part of the liquor
industry to repair its sullied reputation, which ﬁnally convinced distillers and liquor retailers that it was far
215See generally Id. at 45-6; Wells, supra note 160, at 220-29.
216Moore, supra note 99, at 18. The Oﬃce of Internal Revenue was the name of the organization established to collect the
new internal excise tax by the act of July 1, 1862. It was Raum who coined the term “Bureau of Internal Revenue,” which he
used in his annual report to Congress for 1877. The name stuck until 1952, when Congress renamed the entity the Internal
Revenue Service. A Historical Guide to the U.S. Government 40 (George Thomas Kurian ed., 1998).
217Moore, supra note 99, at 20.
39more in their interests to cooperate with the government than to continue to defraud it. Even at the new rate
of ninety cents per gallon, which remained constant from 1875 to 1894, tax evasion without the cooperation
of revenue collectors was still not cost-eﬀective, and Raum’s increasingly eﬀective force of revenue agents
made it harder and harder to ﬁnd corrupt collectors.218
The emergence of a nationwide temperance movement dedicated to eradicating the liquor trade provided
the industry with another powerful reason for compliance with the federal regime of licensing and taxation.
Although the mid-century wave of temperance had dissipated so that by 1875 only three states had retained
their prohibitory laws, the 1880s brought on a tremendous resurgence in the movement. By 1890, three more
states had gone fully dry, and an additional fourteen state legislatures had debated the issue.219 In addition,
the temperance movement had become far more radicalized and had shifted its tactics. Its goal now was the
utter destruction of “demon rum” and the elimination of its evil eﬀect on American society.220
In the face of this onslaught, the liquor industry turned to the federal government for support and validation.
As some Civil War senators and representatives had feared,221 the existence of a federal program issuing
licenses to distillers and retailers and taxing them on a regular basis came to be seen as an endorsement of
the industry.222 In exchange for this implicit endorsement, the post-Whiskey Ring liquor industry willingly
complied with a system of taxation that became increasingly important to the federal government. From
1870-1892, the excise on spirits provided, on average, twenty-ﬁve percent of total federal revenue every year;
during the 1892-1916 period, the average rose to thirty-ﬁve percent, peaking in 1894, when the alcohol
218See id. 18-20, Johnson, supra note 1, at 122-23.
219Hamm, supra note 7, at 25.
220Id.
221See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
222Hamm, supra note 7, at 12.
40excise brought in forty-two percent of total federal revenue.223 Industry leaders were conﬁdent that the high
amounts of taxes they paid to the federal government made their trade indispensable to Washington.224 In
addition, as one industry leader pointed out, the federal tax, which remained constant from 1875-1894, was
fair and predictable, while state taxes might not be. In an 1887 interview, John M. Atherton, president of
the National Protective Association, a collection of distillers and wholesalers, explained:
[I]f the general Government laid no tax upon whisky the States almost certainly would. As
they are under no compact to lay the same tax, the rate would almost certainly be unequal. For
instance, with a tax of 25 cents a gallon on the whisky produced in Kentucky, the State would have
an abundant revenue for all her needs, without taxing anything else. But it might happen that Ohio
and Indiana would lay no tax, or a very light one, upon whiskey. In that case Kentucky distillers
would be compelled to manufacture at a very great disadvantage, and would, in fact, be obliged to
close altogether. A tax by the National Government bears on all States alike, and aﬀords a fair ﬁeld
for competition.225
The temperance movement had traditionally supported the taxation of alcohol in the hopes that higher
prices would result in reduced consumption, but the state of aﬀairs in the 1880s gave them pause. The
achievement of lowered consumption through higher taxes, ﬁrst voiced by Hamilton and his allies in the
1790s, had proven to be elusive, for any tax theoretically high enough to turn citizens away from spirits was
also high enough to encourage evasion of the tax and adulteration of alcohol to make it less expensive. On top
of this failure, federal taxation had given the industry a weapon to use against temperance activists. When
pressed to defend its existence on moral grounds, the liquor industry, in the words of one author “found
that it could do very well by discussing the needs of the school fund, the police fund, or the road fund,
instead.”226 Finally, in 1887 the Women’s Christian Temperance Union issued the following statement at
its annual national convention: “We advocate the abolition of the Internal Revenue on alcoholic liquors and
tobacco, for the reason that it operates to render more diﬃcult the securing and enforcement of Prohibitory
223Gerritsen, supra note 97, at 109.
224Hamm, supra note 7, at 12-13, 46.
226Id. at 113.
41laws, and so postpones the day of national deliverance.”227
For some time, dating back to the 1847 The License Case ruling,228 it had appeared to the prohibitionists
that the Supreme Court was working to bring that day of deliverance closer. In the 1873 case of Bartemeyer
v. State of Iowa,229 the Court rejected an attempt to use the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
recently passed Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate an Iowa ban on the sale and manufacture of intoxicating
beverages within the state. Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court ﬁrst established that it had long been taken
for granted that the police power included the power to regulate trade in intoxicating beverages, stating,
“The weight of authority is overwhelming that no such immunity has heretofore existed as would prevent
State legislatures from regulating and even prohibiting the traﬃc in intoxicating drinks,” so long as it did
not operate “so rigidly on property in existence at the time of its passage, absolutely prohibiting its sale, as
to amount to depriving the owner of his property.”230 Miller therefore noted that if the liquor in question
had been in possession of an Iowa citizen before the enactment of the state law barring its sale, it would
raise the “grave” question of deprivation of property without due process of law, but concluded that since
pre-enactment possession had neither been established nor, for that matter, considered in the lower courts,
the question was not before the Court.231 As for the Privileges and Immunities Clause question, Miller
rejected it out of hand. Since the right to sell intoxicating beverages was granted neither by state nor federal
law, he wrote, “so far as such a right exists, [it] is not one of the rights growing out of citizenship of the
United States” and thus the Privileges and Immunities Clause was irrelevant to the case.232 Four years
later, in Boston Beer Co. v. State of Massachusetts,233 the Court stated in no uncertain terms that its
holding in Bartemeyer had comprehensively established “that as a measure of police regulation, looking to
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42the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States.”234 In the 1884 case of Foster v.
State of Kansas,235 the Court went so far as to say that the question of whether a state law “prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors” could ever be found unconstitutional was “no longer open
in this court.”236
Despite the seemingly deﬁnitive nature of the Court’s rulings on the subject, the United States Brewers’
Association decided to reopen the question in 1881 by putting its tremendous resources behind a test case,
resulting in a verdict that distressed both the alcoholic beverages industry and the temperance movement.237
That case, Mugler v. Kansas,238 ﬁnally reached the Supreme Court in 1887. Although the Court sustained
the constitutionality of Kansas’ prohibition laws against a plethora of attacks based on the Fourteenth
Amendment, marking the case a failure for the Brewers’ Association, the wording of Justice Harlan’s opinion
was far from the deﬁnitive statements made by Justices Miller and Bradley in Bartemeyer and Beer Co.,
respectively, and Chief Justice Waite in Foster. Harlan wrote:
That legislation by a state prohibiting the manufacture within her limits of intoxicating
liquors, to be there sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, does not necessarily infringe any
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the constitution of the United States, is made clear by the
decisions of this court, rendered before and since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.239
In three years, the Court’s position had gone from a statement that it was no longer an open question that “a
state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors was not repugnant to the constitution
of the United States”240 to a qualiﬁed declaration that such a law “does not necessarily infringe any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the constitution of the United States.”241
234Id. at 33.
235112 U.S. 205 (1884)
236Id. at 206.
237Hamm, supra note 7, at 49.
238123 U.S. 623 (1887).
240Foster, 112 U.S. at 206.
241Mugler, 123 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
43Even more alarming from a prohibitionist point of view, however, were the implications of Harlan’s holding
and Justice Field’s dissent regarding the validity of The License Cases, which for four decades had allowed
‘dry’ states to prohibit the importation of intoxicating beverages from their sister states. In a bit of dicta
buried at the bottom of his opinion, Harlan seemed to indicate that the question of whether the commerce
clause prevented states from placing restrictions on the import and export of intoxicating liquors, decided
in the negative in The License Cases, was an open question that the Court retained the right to review:
A portion of the argument in behalf [sic] of the defendants is to the eﬀect that the statutes of
Kansas forbid the manufacture of intoxicating liquors to be exported, or to be carried to other states,
and, upon that ground, are repugnant to the clause of the constitution of the United States, giving
congress power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. We need
only say, upon this point, that there is no intimation in the record that the beer which the respective
defendants manufactured was intended to be carried out of the state or to foreign countries. And,
without expressing an opinion as to whether such facts would have constituted a good defense, we
observe that it will be time enough to decide a case of that character when it shall come before
us.242
Field, in dissent, went even further. Citing Marshall’s reasoning in Brown v. Maryland on the linkage be-
tween Congress’s right to authorize import and the implied authorization of a right to sell,243 he stated, “I
am not prepared to say that the state can prohibit the manufacture of such liquors within its limits if they
are intended for exportation, or forbid their sale within its limits, under proper regulations for the protection
of the health and morals of the people, if congress has authorized their importation.”244 He concluded by
noting, “The construction of the commercial clause of the constitution, upon which [The] License Cases
were decided appears to me to have been substantially abandoned in later decisions.”245
The case of Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company,246 decided in 1888, set in motion a series
of events that would ultimately result in the overruling of The License Cases. Bowman involved an Iowa
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244Mugler, 123 U.S. at 675 (Field, J. dissenting).
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44law requiring common carriers to obtain a certiﬁcate from a county auditor before bringing any intoxicating
beverages within the state. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Matthews noted, “It cannot be doubted that
the law of Iowa now under examination, regarded as a rule for the transportation of merchandise, operates
as a regulation of commerce among the states”247 and held that although it did not contravene any speciﬁc
legislation by Congress, “it is nevertheless a breach and interruption of that liberty of trade which congress
ordains as the national policy, by willing that it shall be free from restrictive regulations.”248 After holding
the law unconstitutional, essentially on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, Matthews went on, in dicta, to
suggest that the Court’s holding guaranteeing the right to import intoxicating beverages implied, as Marshall
had suggested in his Brown v. Maryland dicta, an attendant right to sell such items, but declined to so
rule.249
Two years later, in the case of Leisy v. Hardin,250 the Court made that dicta law. In an opinion that quoted
extensively from Brown v. Maryland, The License Cases, and Bowman, Chief Justice Fuller held that the
right to import intoxicating beverages, guaranteed in Bowman, “includes by necessary implication the right
of the consignee to sell it in unbroken packages at the place where the transportation terminates.”251 In
so holding, the Court ruled unconstitutional the Iowa prohibitory law, which, in response to Bowman, had
been expanded to bar all sales of intoxicating beverages, whether produced in state or imported. Fuller’s
opinion explicitly overturned The License Cases, explaining that its authority, “in so far as it rests on the
view that the law of New Hampshire was valid because congress had made no regulation on the subject,
must be regarded as having been distinctly overthrown by the numerous cases hereinafter referred to.”252
Accepting the Cooley national-local distinction established by the Taney Court in its dormant Commerce
247Id. at 479.
248Id. at 498.
249Id. at 499-500. Interestingly, Harlan dissented. His opinion in the case rejected the existence of a dormant Commerce
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power of the state was suﬃcient to enable Iowa to restrict rail traﬃc within its borders. Id. at 524 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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45Clause jurisprudence,253 Fuller held that the interstate traﬃc in liquor was a national subject, and therefore,
in the absence of congressional permission, no state could pass any act hindering that traﬃc.254
Leisy thus established as law the ‘original package’ doctrine ﬁrst suggested by Marshall in his Brown v.
Maryland dicta. So long as imported liquors were retailed in their original packaging, they remained in
the stream of interstate commerce, and any state law barring their sale was an unconstitutional violation
of the interstate commerce clause. The result was an explosion of so-called “original package houses” and
“supreme court saloons” in every prohibition state.255 The former set of establishments retailed imported
intoxicating beverages in their original packaging as if the state’s prohibitory laws did not exist. The latter
allowed patrons to drink on the premises, with proprietors taking great care to ensure that it was always
their customers, not they, who opened the bottles they served- thus ensuring that the drinker received his
alcohol in its original packaging.256
VIII. Congress Responds: The Wilson Act
The outrage produced amongst temperance activists by Leisy and the resulting trade in original package
liquor spurred Congress into action to address the situation. Three times over the course of his opinion in
Leisy, Fuller had expressed the Court’s conviction that state legislation that regulated interstate commerce
“without congressional permission” was unconstitutional, implying that such legislation would pass consti-
253See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
254Bowman, 135 U.S. at 125.
255Hamm, supra note 7, at 69-70.
256Id. at 71.
46tutional muster if that permission was granted.257 Interestingly, the push to grant that permission came not
from prohibitionists, who had not yet turned to federal-level activism and lobbying, but instead from moder-
ate Republicans, who feared that the result of Leisy, if left intact, would transform prohibition from an issue
in a handful of states into a nationwide battle from which the Democrats would beneﬁt.258 The Republicans
hoped to keep the issue of prohibition conﬁned to the state level, where it could be voted on by citizens
in referendums rather than by national legislators wary of alienating voters by taking the wrong stance.259
As such, it was Republican Senator James Wilson of Iowa who introduced a bill explicitly mandating that
any laws enacted under a state’s police power would apply to imported intoxicating beverages.260 Wilson
explained in an 1890 interview that his bill was by no means a prohibition measure, merely one granting
the states “what may be called a local option, to allow them to do as they please in regard to the liquor
question. They can have prohibition, high license, local option, or free liquor.”261 He indicated to his fellow
senators that he believed the Supreme Court would ﬁnd such a measure fully constitutional.262
Opponents of the bill attacked it almost exclusively on constitutional grounds. Senator George Vest of Mis-
souri emphasized that the bill was a dangerous precedent that threatened to eﬀectively nullify the interstate
Commerce Clause. If Congress could pass a law exempting the states from the Commerce Clause insofar
as it pertained to the alcohol trade, he warned, there was nothing preventing it from following such a law
with “a successive series of such bills” exempting tobacco, oleomargarine, or any of a myriad of items.263
Senator Richard Coke of Texas argued that the bill constituted an unlawful abdication of power on the part
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47of Congress, explaining, “It is a familiar principle of law...that delegated power can not be delegated.”264
Vest, Coke, and their supporters, however, were primarily using their constitutional arguments as a cloak for
their true motives, which were straightforwardly anti-prohibitionist.265 Both Vest and Coke were staunch
believers in states’ rights and a weak federal government; both had served in the Confederate military, and
Vest had been a member of its Congress.266 Vest, in fact, had served as attorney for brewer Peter Mugler,
his fees paid by the United States Brewers’ Association, in Mugler v. Kansas.267
Regardless of the true motives of the bill’s opponents in the Senate, however, the strategy of emphasizing its
constitutional ﬂaws backﬁred spectacularly. By explicitly removing the contentious issue of prohibition from
the debate, they relieved the bill’s supporters of having to overcome an aversion on the part of a number
of senators to supporting any measure seen as prohibitionist.268 Wilson and his allies were therefore able
to rally support for the bill around the issue of states’ rights. Prominent Missouri Democrat Senator James
George, for example, originally opposed the bill as a dangerous endorsement of the existence of a level of
federal power over interstate commerce which he believed the Constitution did not grant- he believed that
the interstate commerce clause only applied to items that were actually in transit. He switched sides on prag-
matic grounds, however, lending his support to the bill in the belief that it would advance states’ rights.269
He explained that his advocacy of the bill sprang from his conviction that “only through such legislation
can the states, under the decision of the Supreme Court, exercise their rightful and necessary jurisdiction”
over trade in intoxicating beverages.270 The bill passed the Senate thirty-four to ten, carried by a coalition
of prohibitionists, states’ rights advocates, and self-interested Republicans.271
In the House, the bill took a more circuitous route to passage. The version of the bill reported out by the
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48House Judiciary Committee was far broader than the one that had been approved in the Senate, mandating
that “whenever any article of commerce is imported into any state from any other state, territory, or foreign
nation, and held there or oﬀered for sale, the same shall be subject to the laws of such state.”272 In essence,
the House version would have elevated the police power of the states above the interstate commerce power
of the Congress in all cases, creating a tremendous shift in the federal-state balance of power.
Ironically, the bill met its ﬁercest opposition from states’ rights advocates who, unlike Senator George, were
unwilling to advance their cause at the expense of their conception of how the American federal system
worked. Texas Representative David Culberson, a Democrat, stated, “Instead of Congress being the grantee
of powers from the states it assumes to become a grantor of power. The old role is reversed, the creature be-
comes the creator.” If the bill passed, he warned, Congress would presume itself entitled to limit and expand
state power as it pleased, making states “a mendicant at the footstool of federal power.”273 Culberson was
vehemently opposed to the Leisy ruling, which he saw as stripping states of a power over the liquor trade
that was rightfully theirs and had existed since the beginning of the republic, and he viewed the Wilson Act
as implicitly endorsing, rather than overturning, that ruling.274
The bill nonetheless passed the House by a vote of 177 to thirty-eight.275 Republicans formed the majority
of the bill’s supporters, but they were joined by avowed prohibitionists, southern Democrats who favored
Senator George’s views of the bill’s eﬀect vis-` a-vis states’ rights over those of Representative Culberson, and
northern Democrats from dairying states who saw the expansive House version of the bill as a way to control
the burgeoning oleomargarine industry.276
When the conference committee met to reconcile the two versions of the bill, the three-man House delegation
quickly deferred to the Senate version of the bill. Wilson and his two Senate colleagues on the conference
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49committee were adamant that their version of what had come to be known as the Wilson Bill prevail, and
the House members, feeling that that something needed to be done immediately to address the growing crisis
of original package houses and supreme court saloons, allowed the application of the principles contained in
the bill to other industries to be put aside for consideration another day.277
While the Senate version of the bill lost some supporters in the House, especially those northern Democrats
who had voted in anticipation of applying the bill to state bans on oleomargarine, it nonetheless passed by
a vote of 119 to ninety-three278 and was signed into law on August 8, 1890- less than four months after
the Supreme Court had issued its decision in Leisy.279 The Wilson Act, as passed, consisted of a mere one
paragraph, declaring only that any intoxicating liquors imported into a state or territory would, upon arrival:
...be subject to the operation and eﬀect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in
the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids
or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by any
reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.280
The Wilson Act was a powerful victory for prohibitionists. It rendered the “original package house” industry
illegal and served as a valuable precedent: for the ﬁrst time, Congress had legislated on the subject of
prohibition.281 Wilson and his Republican allies, though at best disinterested in the cause of prohibition,
had opened the ﬂoodgates of federal regulation, setting the prohibition movement on a path that would
ultimately lead to the Eighteenth Amendment.282
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50IX. Rectification, Fortification, and “The Discoveries of Science”: Adulteration of
Intoxicating Beverages
For the time being, however, Congress faced another problem requiring its legislative attention: the adul-
teration of intoxicating beverages. Over the course of twenty-seven years, beginning with the ﬁrst failed bill
attempting to regulate domestically produced food and drugs in 1879 and culminating in the June 6, 1906
enactment of the Federal Food and Drugs Act (the “Food and Drugs Act”),283 Congress and the nation as a
whole engaged in an epic legislative battle over the federal role in regulating adulterated foods. Throughout
this period, distillers, brewers, vintners, and retailers of liquor played a key role in the national debate on
adulteration.
Congress took action to ensure the purity of imported intoxicating beverages well before it turned to domesti-
cally produced items. As early as 1862, Congress had considered supplementing its 1848 act requiring purity
inspections for imported drugs284 with legislation doing the same for “all spirituous, vinous, malt, brewed,
or fermented liquors, cordials, or any admixtures thereof, introduced or imported into any port...from
abroad.”285 That bill was never brought to a vote, however, and it was not until 1890 that Congress made it
unlawful “to import into the United States any adulterated...vinous, spirituous, or malt liquors, adulterated
or mixed with any poisonous or noxious chemical drug or other ingredient injurious to health”286 as part of
a bill regulating the importation of food and drugs as a whole.
Well before the passage of the Food and Drugs Act, the federal government found itself in the business of
guaranteeing the purity of whisky. During the Civil War, as detailed earlier, adulteration of intoxicating
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51beverages undertaken in order to avoid the heavy taxes placed on legitimately manufactured items had been
widespread.287 Despite the lowering of taxes after the war’s end, the practice continued, much to the dismay
of legitimate wholesalers and manufacturers. In the same 1887 interview in which he praised the federal
excise tax on distilled spirits for guaranteeing a stable, nationwide level of taxing, 288 John M. Atherton,
President of the National Protective Association (protecting, speciﬁcally, distillers and liquor wholesalers)
noted the prevalence of adulteration and the importance of an outside standard of veriﬁcation. He stated:
Under the Government supervision there are certain marks, stamps, gauges, etc., put on
every barrel of whisky, which serve to identify it. They form an absolute guaranty from the Govern-
ment, a disinterested party of the highest authority, to the genuineness of the goods. There is such
a tendency to adulteration that this guarantee is of great value.289
These stamps were park of the federal system of taxing distillers, which, as established by the
1868 legislation, provided for an extended “bonding” period during which whisky was placed
in a warehouse and allowed to age. Over the course of this period, which was initially set at
one year and subsequently lengthened several times until by 1894 it lasted for eight years,290
the whisky was under the complete control of the federal government. Revenue collectors were
authorized to enter any time, night or day, while the actual owners of the warehouses and the
products within were only allowed access in the company of the collectors.291 This process,
while designed to ensure that distillers would be unable to avoid paying taxes on their product
as they had during the Civil War,292 also served to guarantee the integrity of the product.
When newly distilled whisky was placed in an oak barrel for aging, a revenue collector placed
a stamp on it with a variety of information relevant for the collection of revenue, for example,
the date it was produced and the name of the distiller. At the end of the bonding period,
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52the distiller paid the tax and an additional stamp was placed on the barrel noting the date of
withdrawal from bond. When a consumer or retailer received an unopened, double-stamped
barrel, therefore, he could rest assured that its contents were genuine, government-certiﬁed
whisky.293
The problem, however, was that the double-stamp certiﬁcation only provided a guarantee to
the buyer of barrels. The vast majority of consumers, who preferred their whisky in more
manageable quantities such as in a glass at the bar or a small bottle to take home, often had
no way of knowing whether or not their whisky came from a double-stamped barrel.294 In
1897, therefore, Congress passed the Bottled in Bond Act, which allowed distillers, hitherto
required to sell only in barrels, to bottle their whisky in small, retail-sized containers that
would then be given a certifying stamp by the revenue collector.295
The federal government’s expanding role in certifying the purity of whisky was made necessary by the grow-
ing prevalence of adulterated products and cheap imitations. The invention of the “continuous still” had
made the production of pure, neutral spirits tremendously simple and inexpensive. Such spirits were pro-
duced in a diﬀerent, much less expensive manner than those distilled through the traditional methods.296
The easy availability and low price of neutral spirits led to the rise of the practice of “rectiﬁcation,” in
which neutral spirits were colored and ﬂavored in order to imitate whisky and then passed oﬀ to credulous
consumers as the genuine article. As the legendary Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, Chief Chemist of the Department
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53of Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry during this period, explained in characteristically colorful language,
“The term ‘rectify’ etymologically means to ‘straighten.’ But the whisky rectiﬁer was doing nothing more or
less than making crooked whisky of the crookedest kind that enlivened the throats and gullets of the thirsty
men in that pre-Volstead era.”297
Government investigations soon revealed just how prevalent this “crookedness” was. In 1898, the Senate
adopted a resolution authorizing its Committee on Manufacturers to investigate the existence and extent of
the adulteration of food and drugs to determine “which, if any of said products are deleterious to public
health, and which, if any, of said products are frauds on upon the purchasers.”298 The Committee soon
found itself focusing chieﬂy on whisky, and in doing so, it determined that the majority of whisky sold in the
United States was either adulterated or utterly fake.299 Wiley’s Bureau of Chemistry took a large part in
this investigation of the issue popularly referred to as “What is Whisky?” and determined that there existed
a “radical diﬀerence” between genuine, aged whisky and the imitation product.300 The ‘rectiﬁed’ product,
the Committee found with the aid of the Bureau, was generally made of neutral spirits combined with burnt
sugar, organic acids, artiﬁcial colors and ﬂavors, and oils to create the proper texture, and was sold either on
its own or mixed with genuine whisky.301 Wiley later estimated that by the end of the period leading up to
the enactment of the Food and Drugs Act, the rectiﬁers, “men and business ﬁrms of formidable power and
strength,” controlled from eighty-ﬁve to ninety percent of the domestic market for distilled spirits, placing
them in eﬀective control of the entire distilling industry.302
Adulteration of wine was equally prevalent during this period. As previously noted,303 Americans liked their
wine artiﬁcially strong, which required the addition of alcohol to the naturally produced product. Practically
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54every variety of wine consumed by Americans was therefore fortiﬁed by pure spirits, which were also used to
create ‘imitation’ wines from scratch.304 Wine fortiﬁers, however, found their proﬁt margins lowered when
Congress imposed the high excise taxes of the Civil War on pure spirits as well as potable whisky. Fortiﬁers
soon found that paying $2.50 to $2.90 a gallon for spirits to fortify wine that consumers expected to purchase
on the cheap was less than cost-eﬀective. As demonstrated by the Whiskey Ring scandal, many revenue
collectors of the 1860s and 1870s were not quite paragons of virtue, and fortiﬁers found that the bribes they
paid to revenuers inducing them to look the other way added up to much less than the cost of paying the
tax on spirits. The increasing professionalization of the revenue force after 1875, however, made it far more
diﬃcult to avoid the expenses involved in fortifying wine with legitimately taxed spirits, and American wine
sellers found themselves being undercut by foreign suppliers who could fortify their wine at a much cheaper
cost.305
California’s burgeoning wine industry was able to leverage this foreign threat into an 1890 act by Congress
that tremendously altered the economics of wine fortiﬁcation. The Act passed October 1 of that year allowed
“wine spirits,” that is, grape brandy, to be produced tax-free for the purpose of fortifying sweet wines.306
The fortiﬁcation was required to be done under the supervision of revenue oﬃcers and according to regula-
tions issued by the Revenue Department and could not result in the addition of more than fourteen percent
of brandy by volume in the wine or a total alcohol content of more than twenty-four percent.307 The act
thus saved winemakers over ﬁfty cents of tax per gallon, which allowed them to oﬀer their product to the
public at a lower cost.308 The result was an explosion in production from 1,083,274 gallons in 1890 to a high
of 24,198,767 gallons in 1912.309
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55The act was a tremendous boon to the industry, but the very success it engendered resulted in an uncom-
fortable level of scrutiny for the fortiﬁers. The phenomenal growth enjoyed by the wine industry caused
Internal Revenue Commissioner John W. Yerkes to note in his annual reports in 1904 and 1905 that not
only did the absences of a tax on “wine spirits” deprive the government of a possible source of revenue, the
system actually cost the government $25,000-$30,000 a year for the supervision of fortiﬁcation.310 His calls
for a tax on grape brandy were bolstered by complaints from manufacturers who used denatured alcohol for
industrial purposes and complained of the unfairness of taxing their productive use of alcohol while essen-
tially subsidizing wine fortiﬁers.311
Noting with alarm the bad publicity these two streams of criticism had generated, representatives of the
wine fortiﬁcation industry lobbied Congress to re-impose a tax on the spirits they used, which it passed in
1906.312 The resulting three-cent per gallon tax was twenty-two cents less than Commissioner Yerkes had
suggested, but it did generate three to four times the revenue required to cover the government’s costs in su-
pervising the industry.313 As a reward to the fortiﬁers for ‘acquiescing’ in this tax, Congress added language
to the legislation imposing the excise explicitly allowing the use of sugar and water in wine up to a level of
ten percent by volume.314 Coupled with the fourteen percent by volume limit for grape brandy already in
place, this meant that by 1906, the same year that Congress passed the Food and Drugs Act, American wine
makers were legally allowed to sell wine that was twenty-four percent adulterated.315 In the ﬁrst
decade of the twentieth century, therefore, adulteration in the alcoholic beverages industry was prevalent
and the industry steadfastly opposed to any laws that would prevent the continuation of that state of aﬀairs.
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56Wiley considered the “rectiﬁers,” who controlled the distilling industry as a whole,316 to be among the worst
foes of the federal food purity law.317 Indeed, in a 1946 New York State Bar Association conference held to
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the bill’s enactment, Charles Wesley Dunn, Chairman of the New
York Bar’s Section on Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law and the guiding spirit behind the Food and Drug Law
Institute, cited “the bitter controversies over what is whisky” as one of the key impediments to the passage
of the bill.318 The position of the wine industry on the issue is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the
wine fortiﬁers obtained passage of the bill allowing twenty-four percent adulteration of wine319 only weeks
before the enactment of the Food and Drugs Act. As for the brewing industry, it had been successfully
ﬁghting oﬀ legislation barring the adulteration of beer since 1890 under the pretense of wishing to remain
able to “avail itself of the discoveries of science.”320
X. Wiley on Whisky
Notwithstanding the fervent opposition oﬀered by, among many others, the alcoholic beverage industry, the
almost three-decade long quest for a federal law regulating the purity and labeling of food and drugs ended
in success with the 1906 enactment of the Food and Drugs Act, which was well understood to apply to intox-
icating beverages. The act deﬁned food as “all articles used for food, drink, confectionary, or condiment by
man or other animals;”321 more explicitly, it was subtitled “An Act for preventing the manufacture, sale, or
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57transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors,
and for regulating traﬃc therein, and for other purposes”322 and it authorized the seizure of “any article of
food, drug, or liquor” found to be in violation of its provisions.323 It was therefore clear that all of the act’s
provisions on adulteration and misbranding were intended to apply to intoxicating beverages.
The enactment of the “Pure Food Law” was a tremendous victory for Dr. Wiley, who believed that the
bill would give him the power to end once and for all the adulteration and misbranding of food- including
the sale of the so-called “rectiﬁed” whisky, a special irritant to him. From the time that he ﬁrst started
his study of the whisky question, he wrote in his autobiography, “I was determined to beat the recti-
ﬁers.”324 Wiley’s passion on the point is illustrated by the devotion of an entire chapter of his ﬁery work
The History of a Crime Against the Food Law (“History of a Crime”) to the subject, entitling the chapter
“What is Whisky?”325
Even as Wiley prepared to move against imitation and adulterated whisky, the rectiﬁers, who had struggled
mightily to prevent passage of the Food and Drugs Act,326 immediately sought assurances that the new
law would not prevent them from referring to their product as “whisky,” which Wiley ﬂatly denied. Food
Inspection Decision #45 (“F.I.D. #45”),327 prepared by the Bureau of Chemistry and signed by Secretary
of Agriculture James Wilson, was issued on December 1, 1906 as a response to a series of letters from the
rectiﬁers requesting clariﬁcation on the subject.328 F.I.D. #45 was a deﬁnitive rejection of the rectiﬁers’
requests and a staunch defense of pure whisky. It stated:
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58The question presented [in the rectiﬁers’ letters] is whether neutral spirits may be added
to Bourbon whisky in varying quantities, colored and ﬂavored and the resulting mixture be labeled
blended “whiskies.” To permit the use of the word “whiskies” in the described mixture is to admit
that ﬂavor and color can be added to neutral spirits and the resulting mixture be labeled “whisky.”
The Department is of the opinion that the mixtures presented cannot legally be labeled either
“blended whiskies” or “blended whisky.”...If neutral sprit, also known as cologne spirit, silent
spirit, or alcohol, be diluted with water to a proper proof for consumption and artiﬁcially colored
and ﬂavored, it does not become a whisky, but a “spurious imitation” thereof...The mixture of such
an imitation with a genuine article cannot be regarded as a mixture of like substances within the
letter and intent of the law.329
Secretary Wilson soon made it clear to Wiley that despite having signed F.I.D. #45, he did not agree with its
contents. Less than three months after the promulgation of the decision, Wiley writes in History of a Crime,
he was called into Wilson’s oﬃce to hear George P. McCabe, Solicitor for the Department of Agriculture,
inform the Secretary that “Dr. Wiley’s deﬁnition of whisky is absurd. Whisky is any alcoholic beverage
made from grain, properly colored and ﬂavored, according to the prevailing custom of the trade.”330 Wilson
promptly agreed with McCabe. Wiley protested that only the Bureau of Chemistry had the authority to
make the initial decision as to what constituted mislabeling or adulteration, to which, Wiley writes, Wilson
replied, “I will not take your construction of the law, but that of my Solicitor; that is what he is here for, to
interpret the law to me.”331
Wiley’s response to being overruled by the Secretary was immediate and bold, displaying what one historian
of the time described as his “spiritual zeal of a crusader...[and] keen instinct for the dramatic.”332 Outraged
by Wilson’s decision, Wiley called William Loeb, President Theodore Roosevelt’s private secretary, and asked
for an opportunity to present his case to the president before any further action was taken. Over the course
of the next two weeks, Wiley explains, he waited “patiently” while the president received representatives of
330Wiley, History of a Crime, supra note 293, at 109.
331Id. at 109.
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59the rectiﬁers, usually accompanied by senators representing the states in which the industry was located.333
When he ﬁnally received word that the president would see him, he writes, he was ready: “I had prepared
a moveable laboratory with all the elements necessary to manufacture ten year old Bourbon or Scotch in a
minute.”334 After pausing outside the White House to inform reporters, “I am going to give a lecture to the
president of the United States,”335 he entered the building and set up his experiments. As Wiley recalls the
ensuing meeting, he spoke virtually uninterrupted for two hours, after which the president arose to grasp his
hand and intoned, “Dr. Wiley, I have heard nothing but whisky for the last three weeks, and you are the
ﬁrst person who has ever given me a single idea that I can comprehend.”336
Regardless of whether the president was quite as eﬀusive as Wiley later recalled,337 the doctor had clearly
carried the day. On April 11, 1907, the president himself sent a letter directly to Secretary Wilson, stating:
Straight whisky will be labeled as such. A mixture of two or more straight whiskies will be
labeled “Blended whisky” or “whiskies.” A mixture of straight whisky and ethyl alcohol, provided
that there is a suﬃcient amount of straight whisky to make it genuinely a “mixture” will be labeled
as compound of, or compounded with, pure grain distillate. Imitation whisky will be labeled as
such.338
Roosevelt based his brief letter on a much longer one by Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, to whom he
had referred the matter after his meeting with Wiley. In his comprehensive letter, Bonaparte had emphat-
ically endorsed Wiley’s view, which he would continue to do over the course of the whisky controversy.339
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“I fear this man [Roosevelt] with who I had many good contacts after he became president never had a very good opinion of
me, for I ran afoul of his good will in the ﬁrst months of his administration.” Wiley, Autobiography, supra note 297, 221.
For Wiley’s amusing overview of the relationship between these two larger-than-life ﬁgures, see generally Wiley, History of
a Crime, supra note 293, at 263-74.
339Bonaparte’s long letter addressing the subject ended with a series of tongue-in-cheek suggestions for labeling various
whiskies, imitations, and combinations thereof:
(1) Semper Idem Whisky: A pure, straight whisky mellowed by age.
(2) E Pluribus Unum Whisky: A compound of pure, straight whiskies with all the merits of each.
(3) Modern Improved Whisky: A compound of pure grain distillates, mellow and free from harmful impurities.
(4) Something Better Than Whisky: An imitation under the pure food law, free from fusel oil and other impurities.
Id. at 60.
60The two letters were combined and promulgated as Food Inspection Decision #65 (“F.I.D. #65”) “governing
the labeling of whisky, blends, compounds, and imitations thereof.”340
Over the next several years, the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, a committee within the Department
of Agriculture charged with enforcement of the 1906 law, brought a number of cases in rem against whisky
misbranded under the terms of F.I.D. #65, though not as many as Wiley would have preferred. In all seven
of the cases considered by the courts, the seizures involved were upheld.341 The ever-zealous Wiley noted in
History of a Crime his frustration at the fact that the enforcement power for the law rested with the Board
rather than with his Bureau of Chemistry342 as well as his disappointment that no criminal charges were
ever brought against the sellers of mislabeled whisky.343
Despite the seemingly deﬁnitive nature of F.I.D. #65 and the success of court proceedings under it, the
“What is Whisky” controversy continued throughout the Roosevelt administration. Under pressure from
the rectifying industry as well as members of his own cabinet who disagreed with F.I.D. #65, Roosevelt
appointed a commission to study the question in late 1907.344 The commission’s report, delivered to the
president on February 19, 1909 as his time in oﬃce was coming to an end, was in favor of allowing the liberal
use of the word ‘whisky’ in labeling products made of neutral spirits but recommended the addition of some
sort of qualiﬁer, such as ‘neutral whisky’ or ‘redistilled whisky’ to indicate the nature of the product.345 The
commission, however, had toiled in vain. Attorney General Bonaparte responded to the commission’s report
with a heated letter to the president noting with some sarcasm that the commission, comprised entirely
of individuals with no legal experience whatsoever, had based its recommendations not on the Food and
Drugs Act but rather on a study of a British Royal Commission on whisky that was utterly irrelevant to
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61the construction of the American law. Bonaparte vehemently stood by his 1907 letter on which F.I.D. #65
was based, and the president accepted his recommendation, setting aside the work of the commission and
leaving the standing regulation in place.346
Under Roosevelt’s successor William H. Taft, however, the question was reopened once again, and, as Wiley
was forced to concede, “[the] rectiﬁers gained every point.”347 Taft, who had been sympathetic to the rec-
tiﬁers’ desire to sell their product under the name “whisky” while serving as Roosevelt’s Secretary of War,
ordered his Solicitor General Lloyd Bowers to hold a series of hearings on the issue.348 The result was 1,328
pages of testimony and an opinion by Bowers that satisﬁed no one.349 Bowers’ report recommended denial
of the term “whisky” to describe beverages made wholly from neutral spirits, which enraged rectiﬁers, but
would have allowed for combinations of pure distilled whisky and neutral spirits to be sold as whisky, which
was utterly unacceptable to pure food advocates.350 On December 27, 1909, Taft, having been bombarded
with complaints from all sides, issued a letter stating his position on the matter: pure, distilled whisky was
to be labeled as “straight whisky,” while beverages made to taste like whisky could use that word to describe
their product, so long as they included a modiﬁer explaining the beverage’s origins, such as “whisky made
from rectiﬁed spirits,” “whisky made from redistilled spirits,” or “whisky made from neutral spirits.”351
In response to Taft’s letter, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce and Labor, exer-
cising their authority under the Food and Drugs Act,352 issued Food Inspection Decision #113 (“F.I.D.
346Id. at 129-31, 135-36. Wiley reported an “unconﬁrmed rumor” of the time that Bonaparte had threatened to resign if
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the widespread and furious criticism to which Bowers’ report had been subjected and the president’s outright rejection of his
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62#113”), which marked a complete defeat for Dr. Wiley. Wiley notes with bitterness in History of a Crime
that F.I.D. #113 went against Taft’s letter and in favor of the rectiﬁers in several respects.353 The new
regulation mandated that “all unmixed distilled spirits from grain, colored and ﬂavored with harmless color
and ﬂavor, in the customary ways...if of potable strength and not less than 80◦ proof, are entitled to the
name whisky without qualiﬁcation.”354 By holding that straight whisky, rectiﬁed whisky, redistilled whisky,
and neutral spirits were “like substances” and allowing them all to be labeled simply as “whisky,” F.I.D.
#113 completely ignored Taft’s mandate that ‘whiskies’ made from rectiﬁed, redistilled, or neutral spirits
be labeled as such.355 The rule merely required mixtures of any sort- one pure whisky with another, pure
whisky with neutral spirits, or neutral spirits with other neutral spirits- to be labeled as “blends” of whisky
without any further explanation.356 It denied the use of the term “whisky” for distillates from items such
as fruits or vegetables and required whiskies of one kind simulating another kind to carry a modiﬁer on the
label, for example, if rye essence was added to “highly rectiﬁed distillate of corn,” the product would be
labeled, “whisky- imitation rye.”357 These very minor requirements notwithstanding, Wiley writes, F.I.D.
#113 marked a complete victory for the rectiﬁers and a dark day for the opponents of misbranding and
adulteration of alcohol in particular and food in general. The new rule, which explicitly overturned F.I.D.
#45 and F.I.D. #65 as well as their progeny,358 was, in his words, “the ﬁrst cause of paralyzing the food
law.”359 By signaling that any beverage distilled from grain could be labeled “whisky,” it allowed rectiﬁers
to sell cheaply distilled neutral spirits colored and ﬂavored as whisky under the same name as the genuine
article- exactly what the rectiﬁers had wished for and Wiley had fought against all along.360 F.I.D. #113
353Wiley, History of a Crime, supra note 293, at 147-50.
354Food Inspection Decision #113 (February 16, 1910), in Food and Drugs Act, June 30, 1906: Rules and Regulations
for the Enforcement of the Act, Food Inspection Decisions, Selected Court Decisions, Opinions of the Attorney
General and Appendix 129 (C.A. Gwinn ed., 1913).
355Id.
356Id.
357Id.
358Id.
359Wiley, History of a Crime, supra note 293, at 98.
360Id. at 150. A 1912 editorial cartoon from the Rocky Mountain News issued on the occasion of Wiley’s retirement from the
63remained in place until the onset of Prohibition, when, as Wiley wryly notes in History of a Crime, the
question switched from “What is Whisky?” to “Where is Whisky?”361
XI. Congress Responds...Again: From Wilson to Webb-Kenyon
Just as the Food and Drugs Act did not end the controversy over whisky, the 1890 passage of the Wilson
Act failed to deﬁnitely return the thorny problem of prohibition policy to the states. The very day after
President Benjamin Harrison signed the law, liquor wholesaler Charles A. Rahrer was arrested for selling a
pint of ‘original package’ whisky in a dry state as had been established as legal in Leisy but superceded by the
Wilson Act.362 Funded by a group of Chicago brewers and liquor dealers, he appealed for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court, beginning a test case with the aim of having the Wilson Act ruled unconstitutional.363
The ensuing case, In re Rahrer,364 reached the Supreme Court in 1891.
In his opinion for the court in Rahrer, Chief Justice Fuller upheld both the constitutionality of the Wilson Act
and the arrest of Rahrer under Kansas’ prohibition law. Fuller held that the Wilson Act was not a delegation
of the power to regulate interstate commerce from Congress to the states but instead a straightforward
enactment of “its own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule, whose
uniformity is not aﬀected by variations in state laws in dealing with such property.”365 He held that the
Bureau of Chemistry and reprinted in History of a Crime shows Uncle Sam embracing the departing doctor and exclaiming,
“I love you for the enemies you have made!!” Behind the two ﬁgures, cartoon recreations of those enemies dance in glee over
Wiley’s exit. Clearly visible among that group, ﬂanked by “Impure Food” and “Patent Medicine,” is a bottle labeled “Fake
Whisky.” Id. at 97.
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64Wilson Act merely deﬁned the moment at which an item ceased to be involved in interstate commerce:
The power to regulate [interstate commerce] is solely in the general government, and it is an
essential part of that regulation to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing the introduction
and incorporation of articles into and with the mass of property in the country or state. No reason is
perceived why, if congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce
shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than
would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so.366
The implication of the ruling was that Leisy, the continued validity of which was unquestioned by the
Court, had featured both a constitutional holding and a logistical assumption. The former aspect of the
case was still valid: state laws did not apply to items within the stream of interstate commerce. In so ruling,
however, the Court had established a provisional default deﬁnition of what constituted interstate commerce,
holding that an item was a part of interstate commerce until it reached its ﬁnal recipient. The holding in
Rahrer was essentially that Congress, due to its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, had
the right to overturn this assumption:
Congress did not use terms of permission to the state to act, but simply removed an
impediment to the enforcement of the state laws in respect to imported packages in their original
condition, created by the absence of a speciﬁc utterance on its part. It imparted no power to the
state not then possessed, but allowed imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the
local jurisdiction.367
65The Wilson Act, Fuller thus held, merely established that an intoxicating beverage sent from one state
to another lost its character as a part of the stream of interstate commerce before it reached its ﬁnal
recipient, thus overruling the Court’s assumption in Leisy that an item sent to a retailer was still a subject
of interstate commerce until its ﬁnal sale. The Court’s ruling established that once “fermented, distilled,
or other intoxicating liquors or liquids [were] transported into the state of Kansas,” they “became subject
to the operation and eﬀect of the existing laws of that state in reference to such articles,” including an
absolute ban on sale.368
By upholding the constitutionality of the Wilson Act, In re Rahrer gave the temperance movement an
immediate victory over the “original package houses” and “supreme court saloons” that had been the
legacy of Leisy.369 No longer could retailers operate with impunity simply because their wares had been
imported from other states- a state’s ban on the sale of intoxicating beverages now extended to imported
liquor, which Congress had declared to leave the stream of interstate commerce upon arrival in the state.
66The question of what “on arrival” meant, left open by the Rahrer opinion, was answered seven years later in
a case that decisively weakened the ability of dry states to use the Wilson Act to keep intoxicating beverages
from entering their borders. The 1898 case of Rhodes v. State of Iowa370 involved the Iowa statute, ruled
unconstitutional in Bowman, requiring railroads and other common carriers to obtain a certiﬁcate from a
county auditor before bringing any intoxicating liquors into the state. Following the passage of the Wilson
Act, the Iowa legislature had re-enacted the forbidden law. Accordingly, in August of 1891, when John
Rhodes, an Iowa station agent for the Burlington & Western Company, moved a box containing intoxicating
liquors owned by the company from a railcar into a freight warehouse, the state arrested him and seized the
liquor. Justice White, writing for the Court, noted that the “pivotal question” in the case was whether the
Wilson Act “operate[d] to attach the legislation of the state of Iowa to the goods in question the moment
they reached the state line.”371 He acknowledged that the statutory language stating that intoxicating
beverages “shall upon arrival in such state or territory be subject to the operation and eﬀect of the laws of
such state or territory” could be held to mean arrival at the state line, but held that to interpret the law
in such a manner “would necessitate isolating these words from the entire context of the act, and would
compel a construction destructive of other provisions contained therein.”372 Furthermore, he explained,
interpreting the law as such would give Iowa the power to prevent the passage of any intoxicating beverages
through its territory en route from one state to a third state, an obviously unconstitutional state regulation
of interstate commerce.373 Taking into consideration the language of the Wilson Act as well as the plain
fact that it had been enacted as a direct response to Bowman and Leisy, White ruled:
[I]t is reasonable to infer that the provisions of the act were intended by congress to cause
the legislative authority of the respective states to attach to intoxicating liquors coming into the
states by an interstate shipment, only after the consummation of the shipment, but before the sale
of the merchandise; that is, that the one receiving merchandise of the character named should, while
retaining the full right to use the same, no longer enjoy the right to sell free from the restrictions as
to sale created by state legislation–a right which the decision in Leisy v. Hardin had just previously
declared to exist.374
67Rhodes and its companion case of Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.375 therefore deﬁned the Wilson Act
in a manner far narrower than the prohibitionists had wished. Rather than allowing states to ban the
importation of intoxicating beverages, it merely allowed the banning of their resale. State legislation could
take away the right to sell imported liquors, but it could not deny the initial recipient the right to use-
that is, to drink- the beverages he lawfully acquired through the stream of interstate commerce. The result
was an explosion in direct sales of intoxicating beverages to consumers in dry states by cash-on-delivery
shipments from states in which the liquor trade was legal.376
For the next ﬁfteen years, Congress considered a number of bills aimed at overturning Rhodes but, for
reasons both legal and political, failed to take action. The careful manner in which the Court had interpreted
the Wilson Act in Rahrer, Rhodes, and Vance made it clear to Congress that any further steps it took to
allow the states to completely ban the importation of alcohol would be constitutionally problematic. The
Rahrer opinion had emphasized that the power to regulate interstate commerce, “vital to the integrity of
the nation...is solely with the general government.”377 The Court had held the Wilson Act constitutional
in that case because, it explained, all the law had done was to establish exactly when an item left the
stream of interstate commerce, rather than delegate power over that stream. Wilson’s law was therefore
an aﬃrmative act of delineation rather than a delegation of power to the states.378 Rhodes and Vance had
clariﬁed exactly where Congress had drawn that line while reemphasizing that any delegation by Congress
of a power granted solely to the national legislature by the Constitution would raise serious constitutional
problems. Justice White’s opinion in Vance stressed that “the previous adjudications of the court” had
made clear the “elementary proposition[]” that:
...the right to send liquors from one state into another, and the act of sending the same, is
interstate commerce, the regulation whereof has been committed by the constitution of the United
States to congress, and hence that a state law which denies such a right, or substantially interferes
or hampers the same, is in conﬂict with the constitution of the United States.379
68Similarly, in Rhodes, White emphasized that Congress, through the Wilson Act, had declared that mer-
chandise that had reached a recipient through the stream of interstate commerce was no longer a part of
that stream, and if the states wished to bar the item from resale, there would be no constitutional problem,
for such sales were “but an incident” of interstate commerce.380 The opinion made it clear, however,
that states could not be given the right to ban importation altogether:
On the other hand, the right to contract for the transportation of merchandise from one
state into or across another involved interstate commerce in its fundamental aspect, and imported
in its very essence a relation which necessarily must be governed by laws apart from the laws of
the several states, since it embraced a contract which must come under the laws of more than one
state.381
Overcoming these constitutional concerns was made all the more diﬃcult by a lack of eﬀort and coordination
among temperance activists and legislators sympathetic to their cause in addressing the issue. Prohibition-
ists initially hesitated to pursue action on the federal level, preferring instead to attack the cash-on-delivery
business in the states, the traditional battlegrounds for prohibition.382 The result was a sequence of di-
vergently worded bills with varying levels of support, all of which the liquor lobby found easy enough to
defeat,383 usually with the help of senators and representatives representing areas where distilling or brewing
was important to the local economy.384 Congressional opponents of the bill relied primarily on constitutional
arguments, using the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Rhodes and Vance to convince a
majority of their colleagues that it was senseless to delegate to the states a power that would inevitably be
struck down as unconstitutional.385
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69By the end of the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century, however, the nature of the relationship between
the federal government and the states had changed to a degree that made concerted federal-level eﬀort on
the part of the prohibitionists the logical next step in their crusade. As evidenced by such measures as
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, the Anti-Lottery Act of 1895,
and most notably the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, Congress was increasingly willing to use the interstate
commerce power to address important social questions that aﬀected the nation as a whole.386 Under these
circumstances, therefore, temperance activists slowly began to turn their eﬀorts to convincing Congress to
build upon on what it had done of its own initiative through the Wilson Act.387 Beginning in 1903388 and
culminating in a major national conference in 1911,389 supporters of prohibition directed their eﬀorts towards
producing and presenting to Congress a bill that would overturn Rhodes and Vance without violating the
Court’s warnings against the unconstitutional delegation of power to the states.
As a result of these eﬀorts, in December 1911 the temperance lobby produced a bill designed to deprive
intoxicating beverages of their character as subjects of interstate commerce under certain circumstances, a
departure in style from the failed bills of the past decade that had attempted to directly overrule Rhodes
by mandating an earlier point in time at which alcohol was designated to have left the stream of interstate
commerce.390 The measure was introduced in the Senate by William S. Kenyon of Iowa and in the House by
Morris Sheppard of Texas with the support of the Anti-Saloon League in early 1912, but due to the zealous
advocacy of co-sponsor Representative E. Yates Webb of North Carolina, a passionate prohibitionist, it soon
became known as the Webb-Kenyon Bill.391 The bill was meant to prohibit the shipment or transportation
of intoxicating beverages from one state to another whenever the beverages were intended to be received,
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70possessed, sold, or used in violation of the latter state’s laws.392
The bill’s opponents attacked it on both constitutional and practical grounds. They charged not only that
it was an unconstitutional delegation of the commerce power to the states393 but also that it violated the
constitutional liberties of individual citizens, who would not be allowed to import liquor for personal use
or for use as sacramental wine for religious purposes.394 The liquor industry charged that the bill would
allow states to pass laws persecuting both citizens who wished to obtain intoxicating beverages and those
who provided them; moreover, it charged that if the bill passed, the federal government would be helpless
to prevent dry states from crippling the liquor trade on a nationwide basis by denying the use of their roads
and rails for liquor shipments from one non-dry state to another.395
Congressional proponents of the bill vigorously defended it on all fronts. To those who attacked the bill on
the grounds that it unconstitutionally delegated power from Congress to the states, they countered that it
was not a delegation of power but instead the establishment of a uniform national rule, making it illegal for
anyone from any state to ship intoxicating beverages into a state in violation of the laws of that state.396
In response to criticisms of the bill’s eﬀect on individual rights, they raised the subject of states’ rights,
garnering support in the Democratic Congress by portraying the bill as nothing more than a return of the
states’ police power over intoxicating beverages that had been established in The License Cases but stolen
in Bowman and Leisy.397
The success of these arguments, coupled with an unprecedented federal lobbying campaign by temperance
activists, ensured the bill’s passage. Beginning with the bill’s introduction in January 1912, the prohibition
movement used all its resources to ensure that the people and the press of the nation would place members
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71of Congress under unrelenting pressure to vote for the measure.398 This constant bombardment by the
temperance lobby was in contrast to a poor showing by the liquor lobby, which proved unable to move
beyond its base of support among senators and representatives from non-prohibition states, especially those
in which distilleries or breweries could be found.399 After a lengthy period of debate in which numerous
amendments were introduced and subsequently defeated in a series of attempts to derail the legislation, the
measure passed both the House and Senate by landslide margins on February 8 and 9, 1913, respectively.400
Despite its overwhelming margins of victory in both houses of Congress, the bill was dealt a temporary
setback by President Taft. The lame-duck president and future chief justice, relying on his own evaluation
of the bill and advice from his Attorney General, George W. Wickersham, vetoed the measure, informing
Congress that his action was based on his belief that the bill was “in substance and eﬀect a delegation
by Congress to the states of the power of regulating interstate commerce.” 401 He believed the bill to be
both unconstitutional and pernicious, for it would destroy the Framers’ carefully constructed plan freeing
interstate commerce of “the burdens which local state jealousies and purposes had in the past imposed upon
it.”402 Taft waited until the 28th of February, immediately before the adjournment of Congress, to deliver
his veto, but both houses refused to be deterred. The Senate passed the bill over the veto by a margin of
sixty-three to twenty-one that very same day, and the House’s re-passage of the bill on March 1 by a 244 to
ninety-ﬁve margin made it law.403
The enactment of the Webb-Kenyon Act, subtitled “An Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate
character in certain cases,”404 marked an overwhelming and decisive victory for the prohibitionists. The
act mandated that the “shipment or transportation” of “any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
398Id. at 216-17.
399Id. at 217.
400Johnson supra note 1, at 283-84.
401Hamm, supra note 7, at 218.
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403Johnson supra note 1, at 284-85.
404Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913).
72intoxicating liquor of any kind” from one state to another when such beverages were “intended by any person
interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold or in any manner used, either in the original package or
otherwise in violation of any law of such State...is hereby prohibited.”405 In essence, the act gave the states
carte blanche over the matter of liquor regulation, for it rendered the interstate Commerce Clause protection
inapplicable towards intoxicating beverages in the face of any state law banning their import. Under the
Webb-Kenyon Act, all of the dry states’ safeguards against the importation of intoxicating beverages that
had been rendered unconstitutional by Bowman, Leisy, and Rhodes were made valid once again.406
XII. Conclusion and Postscript
The passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act marked the beginning of the inexorable drive for a constitutional
amendment establishing prohibition on a nationwide basis,407 an epic subject that is beyond the scope of
this paper but can be brieﬂy summarized as follows. In its 1913 annual convention, the powerful Anti-
Saloon League appointed a commission to draft a constitutional amendment banning the sale, manufacture,
transportation, or importation of intoxicating liquors in the United States, which was presented December
10, 1913 to Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas and Representative Richmond Hobson of Alabama by several
thousand marchers forming a “human petition” in support of the measure.408 The amendment submitted by
the two men, both Democrats and ardent prohibitionists, garnered a majority in its ﬁrst vote in the House,409
and although it did not reach the two-thirds majority required for submission to the states, it nonetheless
405Id. at 699-700 (1913).
406Hamm, supra note 7, at 220-21.
407See generally id. at 220; Larry Engelmann, Intemperance 66 (1979); Johnson supra note 1, at 285.
408Hamm, supra note 7, at 228.
409Johnson supra note 1, at 288-89.
73became a rallying point for the prohibitionists.410 Even as the battle for national prohibition intensiﬁed, state
after state took matters into its own hands, delivering ever-greater momentum to the cause of prohibition.
By 1917, twenty-three states had enacted their own prohibition measures.411 In January of that year, in the
case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co.,412 the Supreme Court deﬁnitively upheld the
constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act, holding that the constitutional power exerted to enact that law
was “essentially identical” to that exercised under the unquestionably constitutional Wilson Act.413 Chief
Justice White explained:
[W]e can see no reason for saying that although Congress, in view of the nature and character
of intoxicants, had a power to forbid their movement in interstate commerce, it had not the authority
to so deal with the subject as to establish a regulation (which is what was done by the Webb-Kenyon
Law) making it impossible for one state to violate the prohibitions of the laws of another through
the channels of interstate commerce.414
A month later, pro-liquor Senator James Reed of Missouri inadvertently handed a major victory to the
prohibitionists by proposing what he thought was sure to be a controversial amendment to a popular bill
calling for federal penalties against anyone using the mail to send liquor advertisements into a state in which
such advertisements were illegal. Reed’s ‘radical’ amendment, designed to split, and thus embarrass, the
prohibition forces, called for an outright ban on the shipment of all intoxicating beverages into dry states,
whether or not the state itself had banned importation.415 To Reed’s horror, the amendment passed both
Houses of Congress, and what became known as the Reed Bone-Dry Amendment became law in 1917 as
part of a post oﬃce appropriations bill.416 The Food Control Act of 1917,417 a wartime measure, made
the production of distilled spirits for beverage purposes illegal, to which injury Congress added the insult
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74of increased taxes on the sale of all spirits that had been distilled before the enactment of the ban on
distilling.418 Finally, the War Time Prohibition Act,419 which became eﬀective July 1, 1919, made it illegal
to sell spirits or wine until the conclusion of the postwar demobilization.
By this point, Prohibition was all but a certainty. On December 17, 1917, the measure that was to become
the Eighteenth Amendment passed the House by a vote of 282 to 128; the next day, it gained Senate approval
by the overwhelming margin of forty-seven to eight.420 On January 16, 1919, the amendment went into eﬀect
with its ratiﬁcation by Nebraska, the thirty-sixth of what would ultimately be forty-six states giving their
approval to the measure.421 Later that year, with the enactment of the Volstead Act and its ban on the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages,422 Prohibition began.
Prohibition, of course, did not bring about a resolution of the debate over intoxicating beverages and the erad-
ication of “demon rum” and its pernicious eﬀects from American society as its proponents had envisioned423
but instead led to an even greater struggle. In his book Intemperance: The Lost War Against Liquor, author
Larry Englemann explained:
Laws alone would never quench mankind’s age-old thirst for intoxicating liquor. The apostles
of prohibition who stirred the masses with heady visions of a world redeemed from alcohol were
guilty of a fundamental misconception. The Eighteenth Amendment, they assumed, was a ﬁnal
treaty of peace with the liquor traﬃc. They were wrong. The Eighteenth Amendment was, in fact,
a declaration of war.424
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423Fiery evangelist Billy Sunday, one of the temperance movement’s staunchest advocates, famously eulogized “Old John
Barleycorn” as follows:
Good-bye, John. You were God’s worst enemy. You were hell’s best friend. I hate you with a perfect hatred. I love to hate
you.... [T]he reign of tears is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We will turn our prisons into factories and our jails into
storehouses and corncribs. Men will walk upright now, women will smile and children will laugh. Hell will be forever for rent.
Englemann, supra note 407, at xi (quoting Billy Sunday).
75The result of that war was the end of Prohibition and the creation of a regime of federal regulation of
alcohol built largely on the legacy of the pre-Prohibition federal role. The Twenty-First Amendment itself
conclusively addressed a part of that legacy, the dormant Commerce Clause issue that had so bedeviled
Congress and the Court for decades. Section 2 of the amendment reads, “The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited”425- a striking passage deﬁnitively solving the issue only
partially addressed by the Wilson Act and Webb-Kenyon Act by using the Constitution itself to grant states
the ability to keep alcohol from entering their borders, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause.
The basic federal regulatory regime in place today is framed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
of 1935 (the “FAA Act”),426 which was based largely on the 1868 act,427 the tax and collection provisions
of which had never been repealed, as well as the Food and Drugs Act. The speciﬁcity of the labeling
requirements of alcoholic beverages contained within the FAA Act, combined with the lack of any speciﬁc
mention of alcohol in the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act of 1938,428 led to a series of court rulings
that have established a division of responsibility in carrying out the federal government’s role in regulating
alcohol. While the Food and Drug Administration, the successor agency to Wiley’s Bureau of Chemistry,
maintains jurisdiction over the adulteration of alcoholic beverages, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (“BATF”) regulates their labeling.429
425U.S. Constitution. amend. XXI, §2.
426Act of August 29, 1935, ch. 814, 49 Stat. 977 (1935) (codiﬁed as amended at 27 U.S.C.S. §§ 201-218 (2001)).
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and distilled spirits contaminated by ﬂood waters were adulterated and misbranded under §402(a) of the Federal Food, Drugs,
and Cosmetics Act of 1938); Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. Matthews, 435 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Ky. 1976) (holding that
despite applicability of adulteration provisions of Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 to adulteration of alcoholic
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76As for the regulations that have been promulgated by the BATF, Dr. Wiley would perhaps be greatly
disappointed. The BATF deﬁnes “whisky” as “an alcoholic distillate from a fermented mash of gain produced
at less than 190◦ proof in such manner that the distillate possesses the taste, aroma, and characteristics
generally attributed to whisky, stored in oak containers...and bottled at not less than 80◦ proof, [including]
mixtures of such distillates for which no speciﬁc standards of identities are prescribed,”430 a deﬁnition not at
all dissimilar to that suggested, to Wiley’s horror, by Department of Agriculture Solicitor George McCabe
in 1907.431
Notwithstanding the ﬁnal outcome of the “What is Whisky?” battle, Dr. Wiley would likely be pleased
with the federal role in the regulation of intoxicating beverages today, as would James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, David A. Wells, and all of their contemporaries who argued for a substantive federal role over
alcoholic beverages. The precedents they established regarding taxation and adulteration survived the era
of Prohibition and continue to inﬂuence the federal government’s regulation of intoxicating beverages to the
present day.
43027 C.F.R. §5.22(b) (2001).
431“Whisky is any alcoholic beverage made from grain, properly colored and ﬂavored, according to the prevailing custom of
the trade,” Wiley, History of a Crime, supra note 293, at 109; see supra note 330 and accompanying text.
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